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I.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to §§ 35-1-82.53(2), 35-1-86 and 63-46B-16, Utah Code
Ann, 1953, as amended.
II.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
A.

The preliminary issue to be decided by this Court is,

did the Industrial Commission err in not finding Mark Bundy d/b/a
Mark Bundy Trucking (hereinafter "Bundy"), the common law
uninsured employer, and/or the Uninsured Employer's Fund jointly
liable with BB & B Transportation (hereinafter "BB & B " ) , the
statutory employer, for a portion of the death benefits awarded
the deceased's minor heirs as is required by §35-1-107, Utah Code
Ann., as amended in 1988? (Appendix 1 hereto)
B.

Did the Industrial Commission properly determine that BB

& B was the only employer of the deceased?
issue include:

Sub-issues to that

1) Were Bundy and BB & B in a joint venture

sharing control responsibilities making Phillipsen a joint
employee, and 2) Did the Industrial Commission properly apply and
interpret the "lent employee doctrine" when it found BB & B was
the "only employer" of the deceased when the doctrine itself
states that when the conditions for a finding of "lent employee"
are present, it necessarily follows that both the "special
employer" and the "actual employer" are liable for workmen's

1

compensation?

Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, 1993, §48,

Lent Employees and Dual Employment, p. 8-434.
C.

Did the Industrial Commission commit reversible error by

looking beyond the stipulation of the parties that BB & B was a
"statutory employer" of the deceased to find a different
relationship in an effort to protect the Employer's Reinsurance
Fund it administers from contributing to the workers compensation
obligation of an insolvent employer?

§35-1-107 U.C.A., as

amended in 1988.
D.

Did the Industrial Commission commit reversible error by

basing its order on legal theories not raised by the parties
without giving those adversely affected an opportunity to brief
and argue the issues?
III.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review is a correction of error standard
without deference to the decision of the administrative agency
when "the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law."
Utah Administrative Procedures Act Section 63-46b-16(4)(d) &
(h)(iv) Utah Code Ann.;

Morton International, Inc., v. Auditing

Division of the Utah State Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah
1991); Mor-Flo Industries v. Board of Review, 817 P.2d 328 (Utah
App. 1991).

The above is the standard on each of the issues

before the Court.

2

IV.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND CITATIONS TO THE RECORD SHOWING THAT
THE ISSUES WERE PRESERVED BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
A.

Nature of the Case

The Industrial Commission of Utah awarded death benefits to
the minor heirs of Robert T. Phillipsen who was killed while
driving a truck in the course of his employment.

(See Findings

of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, R. 224-235 attached as
Appendix 2 hereto; and Order Granting Motion for Review, R. 224275-281 attached as Appendix 3 hereto,)
not contest the award of benefits.

The parties on appeal do

Rather the parties contest

which of them is responsible for those payments and in what
proportion they are responsible.
to the appeal.

The minor heirs are not parties

While the issues among the parties are being

determined the petitioner, Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah
(hereinafter "WCF"), the workers compensation insurance carrier
for BB & B, is advancing payment of compensation benefits.
B.

Course of Proceedings.

The decedent herein, Robert T. Phillipsen, was fatally
injured May 10, 1991, while driving a truck owned by respondent
Bundy and leased to petitioner BB & B.

The minor heirs of Robert

T. Phillipsen filed a claim for death benefits on August 3, 1992.
(R. 4)

Though filed beyond the statutory one year limitation

period (§35-1-98 U.C.A.), the administrative law judge found the
tolling provisions of § 78-12-36 U.C.A. to be applicable.
47)

No party contests that decision.

3

(R.

An evidentiary hearing was conducted on April 22, 1993.
100, R. 357-432)

(R.

At the hearing counsel for BB & B and WCF

stipulated that for the purposes of the application for death
benefits, BB & B was a statutory employer of deceased.

The

administrative law judge and the other parties acceded to the
stipulation.

(R. 359-360)

The administrative law judge entered

his Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Order on May 6, 1993.
(Appendix 2 hereto.)

Applying the facts to the law, the

administrative law judge found essentially the following:
1.

The deceased was an employee of respondent Bundy

and a statutory employee of petitioner BB & B;
2.

Respondent Bundy is an employer jointly responsible

with petitioner WCF for the payment of death benefits to the
minor heirs.
3.

The WCF is to pay the benefits in the first

instance subject to being reimbursed 50% from Bundy.
4.

In the event Bundy is insolvent or unable to pay

the liability assessed, pursuant to § 35-1-107, Utah Code Ann.,
Uninsured Employer's Fund (hereinafter "UEF") will be responsible
to pay Bundy's 50%.
UEF filed a Motion for Review on June 1, 1993, arguing the
following:
1.

The issue is one of statutory construction of §35-

1-107 U.C.A.;
2.

The statutory employer (BB & B) should be

responsible for 100% of the death benefits because in UEF's
4

interpretation of §35-1-107 U.C.A., the role of the UEF is as a
fund of last resort or "safety net" in the event all employers
and statutory employers are uninsured and insolvent.
(R. 269-274)
Bundy filed his Motion for Review on June 7, 1993, arguing
primarily the application of the facts to the law as follows:
1.

The deceased, Phillipsen, was an independent

contractor of Bundy, not in an employee/employer relationship
with Bundy, and therefore Bundy should have no liability to pay
workers' compensation benefits to the Phillipsen minor heirs;
2.

BB & B was Phillipsen's sole employer and therefore

responsible for all of the statutory benefits.
(R. 237-263)
BB & B and WCF filed a responsive memorandum supporting the
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of the
administrative law judge on June 22, 1993.

(R. 264-268)

WCF had

earlier raised the issue of Bundy's joint responsibility for
compensation payments in its argument at the hearing.

(R. 419-

422)
C. Disposition by the Industrial Commission
The Industrial Commission entered its Order Granting Motion
for Review on March 22, 1994, ruling in essential part as
follows:
1.

The Commission adopted the administrative law

judge's Findings of Fact but made different conclusions of law
based on those facts;
5

2.

Though not raised by any of the parties, the

Commission concluded Bundy was a "lent employee" and BB & B was
his "special employer";
3.

The deceased as a "lent employee" was solely in

the service of BB & B at the time of the fatal accident; and
4.

Bundy and UEF are not liable for any portion of the

benefits.
(R. 275-281 and Appendix 3)
V.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Industrial Commission of Utah adopted as its own the
Findings of Fact of the administrative law judge.

(R. 275)

The

sole exception to that was the Commission finding that
"Phillipson was performing the work of BB & B on the date of his
fatal industrial accident."
dispute that finding.

(R. 275)

BB & B and WCF do not

The findings of the administrative law

judge adopted by the Commission conclusively demonstrate that
Phillipsen was also performing the work of Bundy at the time of
his accident.

Bundy's work included the supplying of trucks and

drivers over whom he maintained joint elements of control with
the statutory employer BB & B.

Counsel for BB & B and WCF

stipulated at the hearing that BB & B had the right and had
exercised sufficient control over the operations performed by
Phillipsen to be found a "statutory employer".
acceded to that stipulation (R. 359-360).

All parties

The issue at hearing

then became whether Bundy was also an employer of Phillipsen at
6

the time of his death.

The facts outlined below are undisputed

and either those adopted by the Commission in support thereof.
At the time of the fatal accident Phillipsen was driving a
tractor/trailer unit owned by Bundy (R. 351, 3 69), who operated
as a "sole proprietorship" (R. 368-369).

Bundy leased his

equipment and driver to BB & B (R. 369) pursuant to a "Lease
Agreement".

(Ex. D-l, R. 329-340, 370, Appendix 4 hereto).

The

accident vehicle had placards on it with logos for both Mark
Bundy Trucking and BB & B.
leased rigs himself.

(R. 388)

(R. 379)

Bundy drove one of the

Phillipsen was hired by Bundy and

signed a document prepared by Bundy entitled "Independent
Contractor Agreement".

(Ex. D-3, R. 354-356, 374-375, Appendix 5

hereto).
The Lease Agreement provided among other things:
3. EXCLUSIVE CONTROL IN LESSEE. Lessor
TBundyl shall furnish a driver or drivers for
each unit of the Leased Equipment. Lessee
[BB & B] Shall have the complete care,
custody and control of both the Leased
Equipment and drivers furnished therewith,
provided however that Lessor fBundy] shall
have full and exclusive responsibility for;
(A) hiring, setting the wages, hours
and working conditions of and adjusting the
grievances of, supervising, training,
disciplining, and firing of all drivers, ...
which driver... shall be, either the employees
of the lessor or under the direct economic
control of the Lessor;
(B) paying all operating and related
expenses for the Leased Equipment, including
all expenses of fuel, oil and repairs to the
Leased Equipment, road taxes, mileage taxes,
fines for parking, moving or overweight
violations, licenses, permits or any other
7

levies or assessments based upon the
operation of Leased Equipment...
(Emphasis added.)

Bundy acknowledged that he had the power to

hire and fire Phillipsen (R. 379-380) and in fact was required to
do the hiring and handle all matters dealing with the drivers.
(R. 388)
The Lease Agreement also provided for Bundy to procure and
pay for liability and cargo insurance (R. 333) , to be totally
responsible for loss or damage to the Leased Equipment (R. 336)
and except for a few specific exceptions to be "..responsible for
and ...pay the cost of all fuels, lubricating oils, repairs, fuel
taxes, empty mileage permits or all kinds and types...tolls,
ferries, base plates and other vehicle licenses."

(R. 337)

Bundy in fact performed and paid for those services.

(R. 378,

380)
In exchange for the above retained responsibilities and the
use of truck and driver, BB & B paid Bundy 85% of the gross
receipts keeping 15% for itself.
set the wage of his drivers.

(R. 340)

It was up to Bundy to

Bundy agreed to pay Phillipsen

twenty percent of the amount left after BB & B's 15% cut.

(R.

354-355, 366, 377, 380, 389, Exhibit D-3, Appendix 5 hereto).
& B never paid Phillipsen anything.
Bundy.

(R. 381)

The checks were all paid by

As can be seen both the income for Bundy and

for BB & B was not a set figure.

The amount depended on the

gross receipts from the joint efforts of BB & B and Bundy to
deliver goods to specific destinations.
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BB

Bundy drafted what he titled "Independent Contractor
Agreement" which is signed by him and Phillipsen.
Ex. D-3, Appendix 5 hereto)

(R. 354-355,

The terms of that agreement were

obviously an effort by Bundy to avoid the legal responsibilities
an employer has for its employees.

Notwithstanding that effort,

the administrative law judge correctly found:
...[A]lthough the parties recited in their
lease that they had an independent contractor
relationship, the employee, Mr. Phillipsen,
had no real choice. Mr. Phillipsen was paid
2 0% of the revenue generated for the load
that he took, and there was no evidence
offered to indicate that he had any
negotiation or bargaining power whatsoever
with respect to that term of the agreement.
Further, the truck Mr. Phillipsen was driving
was owned by Mark Bundy. There was no
provision in the contract whereby Mr.
Phillipsen could refuse to haul a load or an
oversized load for that matter. Further, Mr.
Bundy had the governor mechanism repaired on
the truck that Mr. Phillipsen was driving, so
that Mr. Phillipsen could not exceed a
certain speed limit. With respect to the
relationship between Mr. Bundy and Mr.
Phillipsen, Mr. Bundy also retained the power
of control over the decedent. Although the
Independent Contractor Agreement did not
retain that power, Mr. Bundy retained that
power in a separate lease agreement he
executed in 1990, with BB & B Transportation.
In that agreement, Mr. Bundy was to furnish a
driver and was to "have full and exclusive
responsibility for...hiring, setting the
wages, hours and working conditions of and
adjusting the grievances of, supervising,
training, disciplining and firing of all
drivers..."...
*****

...I find and conclude that Robert T.
Phillipsen was an employee of Mark Bundy
Trucking on May 10, 1991, when he sustained
his fatal compensable industrial accident.
9

(Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, Appendix 2
hereto at pages 5 and 6; R. 228-229)
VI.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In 1984, the Utah Legislature enacted §35-1-107 U.C.A. which
established the Uninsured Employer's Fund.

The purpose of the

Uninsured Employer's Fund was originally limited to being the
last resort payer of compensation benefits to injured employees
whose employers had failed to buy workmen's compensation
insurance and were otherwise financially incapable of paying the
benefits. Funds for the UEF are provided through a premium tax
paid by the State's insurance carriers which write workmen's
compensation insurance.

The UEF is administered by the

Industrial Commission of Utah.
An argument was made in 1987 in the case of Jacobsen v.
Industrial Com'n of Utah, infra.,

that the Uninsured Employer's

Fund should either share or pay all of the benefits in situations
when the actual employer is uninsured and there is a "statutory
employer".

The Court of Appeals ruled UEF was not liable for

payments because the statute provided that its responsibility
began only "...when every

employer

of the claimant..."

including

statutory employers were uninsured and insolvent.
Because of the perceived unfairness to innocent "statutory
employers", joint employers and their insurance carriers having
to pay for uninsured employers' failures, the Legislature took
little time in reacting to the Jacobsen case.
10

In 1988, §35-1-107

was amended eliminating the word "every" on which the Court had
relied in Jacobsen.

The Legislature also added the phrase that

the UEF is to "...assist in the payment...if the person's
employer is individually, jointly, or severally liable..."
is therefore obligated to share the responsibility.

UEF

That

accomplishes the beneficent intent of the Legislature to spread
among all insurance carriers the costs of protecting the State's
workmen from unscrupulous or negligent employers' failures to
provide coverage.
Herein, the Industrial Commission overruled the
administrative law judge's well thought out opinion which found
UEF partially responsible to pay benefits.

To do so the

Commission incorrectly ignored a stipulation that BB & B was a
statutory employer.
raised by any party.

Then the Commission injected a theory not
The Commission made no procedural

provisions for any of the parties to address the new theory.

It

misapplied the uncontroverted facts to the "Lent Employee
Doctrine".

The Commission decided BB & B was the only employer

and therefor solely liable.

However, the Commission failed to

recognize that once the elements of the "Lent Employee Doctrine"
have been established for both employers, "...both employers are
liable for workmen's compensation."

Larson,

infra.

The undisputed facts support the conclusion that BB & B and
Bundy each had the right to and in fact exercised control over
Phillipsen.

They were engaged in a joint enterprise of

delivering freight to customers.
11

Bundy supplied the trucks,

maintained the equipment, hired the drivers, set the
compensation, paid the drivers and handled all personnel matters.
In return BB & B took care of the business aspects of the
operation including, customer relations and negotiations, truck
routing and dispatching, billing of customers, collection of
revenue etc.

The gross receipts were shared with Bundy taking

85% and BB & B 15%.
In circumstances such as that, the case authority supports
but one result.
relationship.

Bundy and BB & B shared the employer
Phillipsen was the direct employee of Bundy and a

statutory employee of BB & B. Therefore, Bundy does have an
obligation to pay a portion of the benefits.
and BB & B are joint and equal employers.

At a minimum, Bundy

Because Bundy is

uninsured and apparently impecunious, the responsibility is on
UEF to "assist in the payment" of the benefits to the Phillipsen
heirs.

The administrative law judge's determination that the UEF

share with the Workers Compensation Fund equally in the payment
of benefits in the event Bundy is unable to pay should be reinstated.

12

VII.
ARGUMENT
A. THE UNINSURED EMPLOYERS7 FUND HAS AN
OBLIGATION TO PAY A PROPORTIONATE SHARE OF THE
COMPENSATION BENEFITS WHEN THE INJURED OR DECEASED
EMPLOYEE HAS JOINT EMPLOYERS AND ONE OR MORE OF THOSE
EMPLOYERS IS UNABLE TO "COVER [ITS] WORKERS
COMPENSATION LIABILITIES".1
As will be argued in following points, Bundy and BB & B were
either in an employer/statutory employer relationship or were
joint employers of Phillipsen.
issue first.

The Court should determine this

If the Court decides there are no circumstances

under which UEF could be responsible to pay a share of
compensation benefits in dual employment circumstances, then
there is no real reason to determine the other issues.

As a sole

proprietor entrepreneur without insurance, Bundy apparently has
no assets from which to pay the death benefits to the Phillipsen
heirs.
This is not the first time this issue has been presented to
the Court of Appeals.

In Jacobsen v. Industrial Com'n of Utah,

738 P.2d 658 (Utah App. 1987) the Court was asked to consider
whether the statutory employer and UEF should share in the
payment of benefits when the actual employer was uninsured and
unable to do so.

At that time §35-1-107(1), 1986 stated UEF:

...has the purpose of paying and assuring, to
persons entitled to workers' compensation
benefits when every employer
of the
claimant
who is found to be individually, jointly, or
severally liable...does not have sufficient

*. §35-1-107(1) U.C.A., 1990. See the entire current version of the
Uninsured Employers' Fund enabling statute as Appendix 1 hereto.
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funds, insurance, sureties, or other security
to cover workers' compensation liabilities
under this chapter.
(Emphasis added.)

The Court emphasized that the word "every" was

the controlling feature of the statute.

The reasoning of the

Court was essentially that as long as any entity or individual in
a workers' compensation employer relationship with the injured
employee is capable of paying the benefits, UEF has no
responsibility.
In what one might conclude to be a direct response to the
Jacobsen decision, the Legislature amended §35-1-107(1) in 1988
by eliminating the word "every" upon which the Jacobsen Court
relied.

At the time of the accident in question and currently

the statute reads in pertinent part:
...The fund has the purpose of assisting
in
the payment of workers' compensation benefits
to any person entitled to them, if that
person's employer is individually. iointly,
or severally liable to pay the benefits, but
...does not have sufficient funds...to cover
workers' compensation liabilities...
(Emphasis added.) (See Appendix 1 for the complete text.)

This

Court must consider that the Legislature made the above changes
advisedly.

The term "assisting in the payment" can only

contemplate that UEF has the obligation to "assist" some other
person or entity making compensation benefits.

The elimination

of the word "every" makes it clear that UEF must assist those in
any sort of workers' compensation employer relationship even if
they are capable of paying the benefits because of having
insurance coverage or qualifying as self-insureds.
14

The good sense of this sort of cost spreading is borne out
when one considers how UEF is financed.

Every workers

compensation insurance carrier in the State, including WCF, pays
a premium tax assessed by the Industrial Commission of Utah.

A

portion of the dollars so generated is dedicated to funding UEF.
§59-9-102(2)(a) & (b) U.C.A.

Therefore, in reality, this is a

method for insurance carriers and employers to spread the risk of
being found secondarily or jointly responsible for paying
compensation benefits to cover employers who fail to comply with
the statutory requirement to provide for their employees.

In

other words, it prevents an unfair burden on one employer or
insurance carrier in joint responsibility situations.
The Industrial Commission overruled the administrative law
judge who opined on that issue:
The Uninsured Employer's Fund takes the
position that it is only secondarily
liable...and that [UEF] only has liability in
the eVent that the statutory employer and the
uninsured employer are unable to pay
benefits...The Legislature in the 1988
amendment specifically removed the word every
from that statute. I can only conclude that
the intent of the Legislature in removing the
word every was to overcome the effects of the
decision in Jacobsen v. Industrial
Commission...
...To adopt the position [UEF] which was
urged at hearing, would mean that the
Administrative Law Judge by administrative
fiat and decision would repeal the 1988
amendment to §35-1-107...
(R. 231, Appendix 2 at page 8)
that issue.

The Commission did not rule on

Instead, in a misguided attempt to protect the Fund

it is charged by statute to administer [§35-1-107(2)], it formed
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an unsupported legal conclusion based on the undisputed facts
that BB & B was the only employer of Phillipsen.

This Court

should not succumb to that guise and fail to rule on this most
important issue.
B. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION FAILED TO RECOGNIZE
THE ONLY REASONABLE LEGAL CONCLUSION ONE CAN DRAW FROM
THE UNCONTROVERTED FACTS THAT BB & B AND BUNDY EACH
OCCUPIED A RELATIONSHIP WITH PHILLIPSEN THAT IMPOSES
THE DUTY TO PAY THE PHILLIPSEN HEIRS WORKERS'
COMPENSATION DEATH BENEFITS.
As the Court was previously advised, all parties and the
administrative law judge accepted the stipulation by WCF and BB &
B that it was the statutory employer of Phillipsen.

The

administrative law judge went on to correctly analyze the
standard that establishes without question that both Bundy and BB
& B occupy a relationship with Phillipsen with sufficient indices
of control to require each to pay workers's compensation benefits
incurred as a result of his death.

The judge explained2:

This issue of the effect of an independent
contractor agreement executed by a driver has
been previously addressed by the Utah Supreme
Court in the matter of Harry L. Young & Sons
v. Ashton, [538] P.2d 316 (Utah 1975). In
the Ashton case, the Court addressed the
legal effect of an "Independent Contractor
Agreement" similar to that executed by Bundy
and the decedent in this matter. There the
Court indicated:
It should be had in mind that the issue
is not whether Dennis A. Ashton was an
employee of Young in the dictionary
sense, nor is it to be determined solely
from the terms used. Particularly, its

Because the judge recited the standard so clearly, petitioners will
quote extensively from the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order at
pages 4 and 5. The entire text of his decision is found in Appendix 2 hereto.
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character is not necessarily fixed by
the fact that the agreement recites that
it is not an employer - employee
relationship, but is that of an
independent contractor. The question of
entitlement to workman's compensation
depends on whether the facts and
circumstances bring him within the
requirements of the Workmen's
Compensation Act...
*****

To provide guidance in this area, the
Court set forth the following parameters:
The main facts to be considered as
bearing on the relationship here
are: (1) Whatever covenants or
agreements exist concerning the
right of direction and control over
the employee, whether express or
implied; (2) The right to hire and
fire; (3) The method of payment,
i.e., whether in wages or fees, as
compared to payment for a complete
job or project; and (4) The
furnishing of equipment.
The administrative law judge in reviewing the relationship
between Bundy and Phillipsen quite appropriately found that under
any interpretation of the facts of this case, Bundy was
Phillipsen's employer. (See Appendix 2 at page 6 of Order).
Bundy was required to maintain control over the leased driver by
virtue of his agreement with BB & B.
and fire.

He had the right to hire

He dictated the wages for and paid Phillipsen and was

in charge of all personnel responsibilities involving Phillipsen.
He also furnished and maintained all of the equipment.
The indices of BB & B's control of Phillipsen were different
in some respects.

Nonetheless, BB & B had a limited right to

fire Bundy drivers.

BB & B dispatched the drivers, assigned them
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the loads to haul and expected drivers to prepare all of the
paper work necessary for completion of the work.

Using the

criteria of the Ashton, supra, decision, there can be no doubt
that there are enough indices for the finding that BB & B also
stood in a position of a statutory employer of Phillipsen.
Therefore, the facts are undisputed, the law is clear that
Bundy and BB & B each had a relationship with Phillipsen that had
the earmarks of retained right of control.

Each had an

individual responsibility for the payment of workers'
compensation benefits.

With no factual support and no

substantive legal analysis in its Order Granting Motion for
Review, the Commission has attempted to apply the legal theory of
"lent employee" to make BB & B the sole responsible employer.
Before examining the Commission's misanalysis of that theory, we
will examine the relationship between BB & B and Bundy.
C. BUNDY AND BB & B WERE UNITED FOR A COMMON
PURPOSE FOR MUTUAL PROFIT AND THEREFORE PARTNERS IN A
JOINT ENTERPRISE MAKING THEM COEMPLOYERS OF PHILLIPSEN
WHO WAS PERFORMING THEIR JOINT WORK AT THE TIME OF THE
FATAL ACCIDENT.
The facts as outlined previously leave no doubt that
Phillipsen was answerable to both Bundy and BB & B for his
conduct as a driver of the Bundy equipment.

The relationship

between Bundy and BB & B is memorialized in the Lease Agreement.
Bundy was a sole proprietorship entering into a joint business
venture with BB & B for mutual gain.

Each had certain assets to

contribute in order to produce the revenue.

Bundy was to supply

and maintain the equipment, hire and handle personnel matters
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with the drivers, set drivers' wages and supply the expertise in
hauling freight.

BB & B was to handle the negotiations and

contracts with the customers, organize delivery schedules,
dispatch the drivers, do the accounting, send the customer
billings and collect the proceeds.

The mutual goal was to

efficiently deliver freight by truck for a profit.
paid a fixed amount for his responsibilities.

Bundy was not

Neither was BB & B

to be paid a fixed amount for its responsibilities.

Instead,

Bundy was to receive 85% of the proceeds and BB & B was to
receive 15% of the proceeds.
The administrative law judge recognized the above
relationship in citing to Kinne v. Industrial Commission, 609
P.2d 926 (Utah 1980). (Appendix 6 hereto)

Therein, the Supreme

Court was faced with a similar situation.

Kinne entered into a

contract with Freeport Center to supply a truck and driver for
hauling freight.

While driving pursuant to that arrangement, a

driver hired by Kinne was killed in a collision with a train.
The Industrial Commission held that the driver was an employee of
Kinne and that Kinne was jointly and severally liable for the
compensation award with Freeport Center which was a "statutory
employer."

Kinne appealed that order.

The Court sustained the

Commissions order explaining:
...Kinne is not relieved of his obligation by
the fact that another employer, Freeport
Transport, Inc., was a statutory employer
also responsible for workmen's compensation

coverage. An employee,
workmen's compensation,

for the purpose
may have two

of

employers.
See Blessing v. T. Shriver & Co.,
94 N.J.Super. 426, 228 A.2d 711 (1967).
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609 P.2d at 928.3

(Emphasis added).

The relationships established in the case at bar and in the
Kinne case are analogous to the joint enterprise analysis of this
Court in Aracron v. Clover Club Foods Co., 857 P. 2d 250 (Utah App.
1993) . Though the issue being determined was different, the
philosophy is instructive:
The material question in this case is whether
Borden and Clover Club together constitute an
employing unit analogous to the employing
units created between joint venturers. In
Cook v. Peter

Kiewit

Sons

Co.,

15 Utah 2. 20,

386 P.2d 616 (1963), two companies entered
into a joint venture to construct a tunnel.
Because they were united for a common
purpose, and because whatever one did would
inure to the benefit of the other, both
companies were treated as one "employing
unit," and the employees of both companies
were treated as being "engaged in the same
employment."
386 P. 2d at 255.

Likewise, here Bundy and BB & B were "united

for a common purpose" and for purposes of the Workmen's
Compensation Act they are "one employing unit" each having a

The administrative law judge's opinion is not without precedent in
other jurisdictions. See for example the following taken from footnotes in
Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, Infra.:
Indiana—Long
v. Sims Motor
Transp. Lines, 124 Ind. App. 504, 117 N.E.2d 276 (1954). Lessor of truck
under a "trip lease", who retained right to fire and the duty of upkeep of
truck, was liable for compensation, since the arrangement constituted a dual
employment. Motor Dispatch Inc. v. Snodqrass, 301 N.E.2d 251 (Ind. Ct. App.
1973). The industrial board found that the truck owner and lessee of the
truck which the decedent was driving were coemployers and compensation was
awarded against both. The lessee appealed. The appellate court upheld the
board's order. The test of employer status is: "who has the power to control
and direct the servant in the performance of the particular work." The
evidence was sufficient to demonstrate a mixed control, not necessarily
complete in either.
Louisiana—Maryland
Cas. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Is. Co., 194 So.2d 204 (La. Ct.
App. 1967). Claimant was employed by Baton Rouge, who leased equipment and
operators to others. Claimant was injured while working on a job for Joy.
Held:
The general employer and the special employer were each liable for onehalf of the compensation award.
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responsibility for paying workers compensation benefits.

The

difference here is that BB & B is willing to accept its
responsibility and Bundy is not.

BB & B is willing to accept its

responsibility and UEF is not.
Professor Arthur Larson's Treatise on Workmen's Compensation
Law discusses the relationship the facts present in this case:
Joint employment occurs when a single
employee, under contract with two employers,
and under the simultaneous control of both,
simultaneously performs services for both
employers, and when the service for each
employer is the same as, or is closely
related to, that for the other. In such a
case, Jboth employers are liable
for
workmen's
compensation.
*****

Joint employment is possible,
and indeed
fairly
common, because there is nothing
unusual about the coinciding of both control
by two employers and the advancement of the
interests of two employers in a single piece
of work. It has already been noted that, in
the familiar situation of the leased truck
and driver...the lessor may be accomplishing
his business purpose of furnishing equipment
and labor at a profit, while the lessee is at
the same moment accomplishing his business
purpose of transporting goods...and the
lessor may retain enough control to safeguard
his interest the valuable equipment, while
the lessee may assume enough control to get
his work done efficiently.
Arthur Larson, Larson's

Workmen's Compensation

IB, pp. (Emphasis added.)

21

Law, 1993, Vol.

D. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION MISINTERPRETED AND
MISAPPLIED THE "LENT EMPLOYEE" DOCTRINE. BOTH BUNDY
AND BB & B MEET THE LARSON'S

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW

CRITERIA WHICH REQUIRES THAT BOTH EMPLOYERS BE LIABLE
FOR WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION.
The Commission inappropriately concluded "..the decedent was
a loaned employee solely in the service of BB & B at the time of
the fatal industrial accident."

(Appendix 3 at page 4, R.278)

As argued above, the Findings of Fact adopted by the Commission
do not support such a conclusion.
arguendo,

Even if Phillipsen was,

a lent employee, he was most definitely not solely in

the service of BB & B.

Being a lent employee does not exclude a

joint responsibility to pay compensation benefits.
§48.00 When a general employer lends an
employee to a special employer; the special
employer becomes liable for workmen's
compensation only if:
(a) the employee has made a contract of hire,
express or implied with the special employer;
(b) the work being done is essentially that
of the special employer; and
(c) the special employer has the right to
control the details of the work.
When all three of the above conditions are
satisfied in relation to both employers, both

employers are liable
compensation.
Larson's,

for

workmen's

supra. §48, Vol. IB, p. 8-434.

(Emphasis added).

Being a lent employee is only the first question to examine in
determining whether the obligation for compensation benefit
payments are to be shared.

As argued hereinbefore, the

uncontroverted facts are that BB & B and Bundy both meet the (a),
(b), (c) criteria of the "Lent Employee Doctrine".
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Phillipsen

was hired by Bundy subject to the right of BB & B to verify his
skills as a driver.

Either could fire Phillipsen.

The work

being done was the joint work of the two employers.

They split

the gross receipts received from the operation of the trucks on a
percentage basis with Bundy getting the far greater share.

They

each retained by deed and contract the right to control
Phillipsen's work activities.

In that circumstance Larson and

the cases cited in earlier arguments dictate a shared
responsibility for workmen's compensation benefits.
E. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR BY FAILING TO RECOGNIZE A STIPULATION BY THE
PARTIES ACCEPTED BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE THAT
BB & B WAS THE "STATUTORY EMPLOYER" OF PHILLIPSEN AND
THEN INTRODUCING THE "LENT EMPLOYEE DOCTRINE" AS BASIS
FOR ITS DECISION WHEN IT WAS NEVER RAISED NOR ARGUED BY
THE PARTIES WITHOUT GIVING THE PARTIES AN OPPORTUNITY
TO PRESENT ARGUMENT.
Petitioners will not present lengthy argument regarding this
point.

However, it is important that this Court alert the

Industrial Commission that it has an obligation to provide a fair
forum for the litigants to address the issues before it.

When in

the course of proceedings all parties are represented by
competent counsel, a stipulation consistent with the basic
purposes of fair compensation to injured workmen should be
honored.

That is especially true when the stipulation entered by

the parties actually insures that the dependent minor heirs of
Mr. Phillipsen will receive the compensation to which they are
entitled.

The stipulation by WCF that BB & B was a "statutory

employer11 was the correct approach to take in this case.
insured that the minor children of Mr. Phillipsen would
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It

immediately receive compensation.

They were not caused to wait

for the benefits while the employers contested the issue of who
was responsible and for how much.

Those funds are being paid

while this appeal proceeds.
Furthermore, it is improper for the Commission to introduce
a completely new theory not raised by any party at the motion for
review stage of the proceedings.

The theory simply should be

considered waived if the parties have not raised it.

In the

event it is raised, the parties both for whom the new theory is
helpful as applied and those adversely affected should be given
the opportunity to present arguments.

That right was not

afforded in this case.
The Commission should be alerted to the fact that when it
acts in that fashion, the general impression is that it leaves
its role as an impartial adjudicator and becomes an advocate.

In

this instance it becomes an advocate for the Uninsured Employer's
Fund which it is charged by statute to administer.

Based on long

experience with the Commission, petitioners herein know the
Commission truly tries to be fair and impartial.

However, this

Court's admonition to the Commission to avoid the appearance of
advocacy for a party will be appreciated.
VIII.
CONCLUSION
The Workmen's Compensation Act of Utah has as one of its
purposes to have industry pay the costs of unfortunate accidents
which befall its employees.

The Act does that by spreading the
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liability among all employers by requiring them to obtain
workmen's compensation insurance.

(The sole exception to that is

for the very largest employers who meet the Commission's criteria
to qualify as self-insureds.)

That makes it possible for the

small employers such as Bundy and medium sized employers such as
BB & B to continue in business even when the unfortunate
catastrophic accident occurs.

The Legislature recognized that in

some circumstances employers will not obey the law to procure
insurance.

In such an instance, prior to the passage of §35-1-

107 U.C.A., the injured employee was left without benefits.
§35-1-107 U.C.A. established the Uninsured Employer's Fund
to pay those benefits.

Financing for the Uninsured Employer's

Fund is obtained by means of a premium tax assessed to all
insurance carriers which write such compensation policies.

That

places the burden for defaulting employers back on industry where
it belongs.
After a few years of experience with that system, the
Legislature recognized that "statutory employers," joint
employers and/or their insurance carriers could be hit with a
significant liability in the event common law and/or coemployers
fail to obtain compensation insurance.

A catastrophic accident

could significantly impact the business viability of such
entities.

Therefore, in 1988, the Legislature amended §35-1-107

U.C.A. to make it clear that UEF should share that
responsibility.

The effect is again to place more of the risk on
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industry as a whole and not focus it on an innocent statutory
employer which had complied with the law.
The Industrial Commission of Utah fails to recognize the
Legislature's intent.

Instead, the Commission has misapplied the

"lent employee" doctrine to reverse the correct ruling entered by
the administrative law judge.

The evidence in this case leads to

the Conclusions of Law entered by the administrative law judge.
Bundy and BB & B have a joint liability to the Phillipsen heirs.
Because Bundy is uninsured and incapable of paying his share, the
Uninsured Employer's Fund should fulfill its purpose and pay
Bundy's share.

This Court should reverse the decision of the

Industrial Commission and remand the case to the Industrial
Commission to reinstate the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Order of the administrative law judge.
DATED this

;2^j day of August, 1994.

CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH

Co/Counsel for BB & B
Transportation and Workers
Compensation Fund of Utah
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH

By:
Richard G. Sumsion
Co-Counsel for BB & B
Transportation and Workers
Compensation Fund of Utah
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APPENDIX 1
SECTION 35-1-107, U.C.A., AMENDED 1988

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

35-1-107

History: R.S. 1933, 42-l-97a, enacted by
L. 1939, ch. 51, § 1; C. 1943, 42-l-97a.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 92 et seq.
Key Numbers. — Statutes «=» 64(2).

35-1-107. Uninsured Employers' Fund,
(1) There is created an Uninsured Employers' Fund. The fund has the purpose of assisting in the payment of workers' compensation benefits to any
person entitled to them, if that person's employer is individually, jointly, or
severally liable to pay the benefits, but becomes or is insolvent, appoints or
has appointed a receiver, or otherwise does not have sufficient funds, insurance, sureties, or other security to cover workers' compensation liabilities.
This fund succeeds to all monies previously held in the Default Indemnity
Fund. If it becomes necessary to pay benefits, the fund is liable for all obligations of the employer as set forth in Chapters 1 and 2, Title 35, with the
exception of penalties on those obligations.
(2) Funds for the Uninsured Employers' Fund shall be provided under Subsection 59-9-101 (2). The state treasurer is the custodian of the Uninsured
Employers' Fund and the commission shall direct its distribution. Reasonable
costs of administration may be paid from the fund. The commission shall
employ counsel to represent the Uninsured Employers' Fund in all proceedings brought to enforce claims against or on behalf of the fund. Upon the
request of the commission, the attorney general, city attorney, or county attorney of the locality in which any investigation, hearing, or trial under this
title is pending, or in which the employee resides or an employer resides or is
doing business, shall aid in the representation of the fund.
(3) To the extent of the compensation and other benefits paid or payable to
or on behalf of an employee or the employee's dependents from the Uninsured
Employers' Fund, the fund, by subrogation, has all the rights, powers, and
benefits of the employee or the employee's dependents against the employer
failing to make the compensation payments.
(4) The receiver, trustee, liquidator, or statutory successor of an insolvent
employer is bound by settlements of covered claims by the fund. The court
with jurisdiction shall grant all payments made under this section a priority
equal to that to which the claimant would have been entitled in the absence of
this section against the assets of the insolvent employer. The expenses of the
fund in handling claims shall be accorded the same priority as the liquidator's
expenses.
(5) The commission shall periodically file with the receiver, trustee, or liquidator of the insolvent employer or insurance carrier statements of the covered claims paid by the fund and estimates of anticipated claims against the
fund which shall preserve the rights of the fund for claims against the assets
of the insolvent employer.
(6) When any injury or death for which compensation is payable from the
Uninsured Employers' Fund has been caused by the wrongful act or neglect of
another person not in the same employment, the fund has the same rights as
allowed under Section 35-1-62.
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(7) The fund, subject to approval of the Workers' Compensation Division of
the Industrial Commission, shall discharge its obligations by adjusting its
own claims or by contracting with an adjusting company, risk management
company, insurance company, or other company that has expertise and capabilities in adjusting and paying workers' compensation claims.
(8) For the purpose of maintaining this fund, the commission, upon rendering a decision with respect to any claim for workers' compensation benefits,
shall impose a penalty against the uninsured employer of 15% of the value of
the total award in connection with the claim, and shall direct that the additional penalty be paid into the Uninsured Employers' Fund. Awards may be
docketed as other awards under this chapter.
(9) The liability of the state, the Industrial Commission, and the state treasurer, with respect to payment of any compensation benefits, expenses, fees,
or disbursement properly chargeable against the fund, is limited to the assets
in the fund, and they are not otherwise in any way liable for the making of
any payment.
(10) The commission may make reasonable rules for the processing and
payment of claims for compensation from the fund.
(11) In the event it becomes necessary for the Uninsured Employers' Fund
to pay benefits under this section to any employee of an insolvent self-insured
employer, the Uninsured Employers' Fund may assess all other self-insured
employers amounts necessary to pay (a) the obligations of the fund subsequent to an insolvency, (b) the expenses of handling covered claims subsequent to an insolvency, (c) the cost of examinations under Subsection (12), and
(d) other expenses authorized by this section. The assessments of each selfinsured employer shall be in the proportion that the manual premium of the
self-insured employer for the preceding calendar year bears to the manual
premium of all self-insured employers for the preceding calendar year. Each
self-insured employer shall be notified of his assessment not later than 30
days before it is due. No self-insured employer may be assessed in any year an
amount greater than 2% of that self-insured employer's manual premium for
the preceding calendar year. If the maximum assessment does not provide in
any one year an amount sufficient to make all necessary payments from the
fund for one or more insolvent self-insured employers, the unpaid portion
shall be paid as soon as funds become available. All self-insured employers are
liable under this section for a period not to exceed three years after the selfinsured employer's voluntary or involuntary termination of self-insurance
privileges within this state. This subsection does not apply to claims made
against an insolvent self-insured employer if the insolvency occurred prior to
July 1, 1986.
(12) It is the duty of all self-insured employers to notify the industrial
commission of any information indicating that any self-insured employer may
be insolvent or in a financial condition hazardous to its employees or the
public. Upon receipt of that notification and with good cause appearing, the
industrial commission may order an examination of that self-insured employer. The cost of the examination shall be assessed against all self-insured
employers as provided in Subsection (11). The results of the examination shall
be kept confidential.
(13) In any claim against an employer by the Uninsured Employers' Fund,
or by or on behalf of the employee to whom or to whose dependents compensation and other benefits are paid or payable from the fund, the burden of proof
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is on the employer or other party in interest objecting to the claim. The claim
is presumed to be valid up to the full amount of workers' compensation benefits claimed by the employee or his dependents. This subsection applies
whether the claim is filed in court or in an adjudicative proceeding under the
authority of the commission.
(14) A partner in a partnership or an owner of a sole proprietorship may not
recover compensation or other benefits from the Uninsured Employers' Fund
if:
(a) the person is not included as an employee under Subsection 35-1-43
(3) (a); or
(b) the person is included as an employee under Subsection 35-1-43 (3)
(a), but his employer fails to insure or otherwise provide adequate payment of direct compensation, which failure is attributable to an act or
omission over which the person had or shared control or responsibility.
(15) For purposes of Subsection (14) (b):
(a) a partner of a partnership and an owner of a sole proprietorship are
presumed to have had or shared control or responsibility for any failure to
insure or otherwise provide adequate payment of direct compensation, the
burden of proof being on any person seeking to establish the contrary; and
(b) evidence affirmatively establishing that a partner of a partnership
or an owner of a sole proprietorship had or shared control or responsibility
for any failure to insure or otherwise provide adequate payment of direct
compensation may only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence to
the contrary.
(16) A director or officer of a corporation may not recover compensation or
other benefits from the Uninsured Employers' Fund if the director or officer is
excluded from coverage under Subsection 35-1-43 (3) (b).
(17) Any additional administrative burden imposed by amendments to Subsection 35-1-42 (5) during the 1988 general session of the Legislature may be
funded out of the Uninsured Employers' Fund, up to a maximum of $16,000.
History: C. 1953, 35-1-107, enacted by L.
1984, ch. 77, § 1; 1986, ch. 211, § 12; 1987,
ch. 2, § 35; 1987, ch. 126, § 4; 1988, ch. 109,
$ 3.
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amendment, effective July 1, 1986, in Subsection (1)
substituted "Uninsured Employers' Fund" for
"Default Indemnity Fund" wherever it appears; inserted "of the claimant who is found to
be individually, jointly, or severally liable" before "becomes" and inserted "or is" after "becomes" in the first sentence, inserted the second sentence, added "with the exception of penalties on those obligations" at the end of the
last sentence, and made minor word changes;
in Subsection (2) added "and 31A-3-20K2)" at
the end of the first sentence, substituted "commission" for "attorney general", substituted
employ counsel" for "appoint a member of his
staff", added "and upon the request of the commission, the attorney general, city attorney, or
county attorney of the locality in which any
investigation, hearing, or trial under the provisions of this title is pending, or in which the

employee resides or an employer resides or is
doing business, shall aid in the representation
of the fund," at the end of the fourth sentence,
and made stylistic changes; made stylistic
changes in Subsections (3), (4), (7), and (10); in
the first sentence of Subsection (8) deleted
"from the Default Indemnity Fund" following
claim," substituted "benefits" for "compensation" following "for", inserted "uninsured" before "employer" and "value of the" before
"total", deleted "made" following "award", inserted "in connection with" following "in", and
inserted "Uninsured Employers'" before
"Fund"; and added Subsections (11) and (12).
The 1987 amendment, by Chapter 2, effective February 6, 1987, in Subsection (2) substituted "Subsections 35-l-68(2)(a) and 59-9101(2)" for "Subsections 35-l-68(2)(a) and
31A-3-201".
The 1987 amendment, by Chapter 208, effective July 1, 1987, in Subsection (2), in the first
sentence substituted "under Subsection
31A-3-20K2)" for "pursuant to Subsections
35-l-68-(2)(a) and 31A-3-20K2)."
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The section was set out in 1987 as reconciled
by the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel.
The 1988 amendment, effective April 25,
1988, in Subsection (1), divided the former first
sentence into the present first two sentences
and, in the second sentence, substituted "The
fund has the purpose of assisting in the payment of workers' compensation benefits to any
person entitled to them, if that person's employer is individually, jointly, or severally liable to pay the benefits, but" for "for the purpose
of paying and assuring, to persons entitled to
workers' compensation benefits when every
employer of the claimant who is found to be

individually, jointly, or severally liable" and
deleted "under this chapter" at the end; in Subsection (2), divided the former fourth sentence
into the present last two sentences and deleted
"the provisions of preceding "this title" in the
last sentence; substituted "the employees'" for
"their" twice in Subsection (3), "with jurisdiction" for "having jurisdiction" in the second
sentence in Subsection (4) and "workers' compensation benefits" for "benefits under this
chapter" in the first sentence of Subsection (8);
and added Subsections (13) through (17).
Retrospective Operation. — Laws 1987,
ch. 2, § 331 provides: "This act has retrospective operation to January 1, 1987."

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Carlucci v. Utah State Indus.
Comm'n & Default Indemn. Fund, 725 P.2d

1335 (Utah 1986); Jacobsen v. Industrial
Comm'n, 738 P.2d 658 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).

CHAPTER 2
OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE DISABILITY
COMPENSATION
Section
35-2-1.
35-2-2.
35-2-3.

35-2-4.
35-2-5.
35-2-6.
35-2-7.
35-2-8.
35-2-9.
35-2-10.
35-2-11.

35-2-12.
35-2-13.
35-2-14.

Short title.
Act to be administered by Industrial Commission.
Exclusive remedy against employer, or officer, agent or employee — Accidental miuries
within Workmen's Compensation Act excepted.
Industrial Commission may sue
or be sued — Service of process.
Commission to prescribe rules
and regulations.
Claims to be filed with commission.
Commission — Powers.
Depositions of witnesses.
Record of proceedings.
Employers enumerated and defined — Regularly employed —
Independent contractors.
"Employees," "workmen" and "operatives" defined — Casual employment — Mining lessees and
sublessees — Partnership members.
Construction of terms.
Employer liability for compensation — Conditions when no payment to be made.
Last employer liable — Exception.

Section
35-2-15.

35-2-16.
35-2-17.
35-2-18.
35-2-19,
35-2-21.

35-2-22.
35-2-23.
35-2-24.
35-2-25.
35-2-26.
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Benefits — Amounts — Permanent total disability — Vocational rehabilitation — Procedure and payments — Temporary total disability — Death —
Dependents — Medical, hospital and burial expenses.
Employers to secure compensation — Ways allowed.
Repealed.
State department, commission,
board, or agency to pay premiums direct to insurance fund.
35-2-20. Repealed.
Employers' failure to comply a
misdemeanor — Penalty —
False claim by employee a misdemeanor — Disposition of
funds collected.
Noncomplying employer — To
pay compensation — Failure to
pay.
Docketing of award creates lien —
Execution.
Judgments for nonpayment of
premiums — Preference.
Waiting period after disability —
Exception as to disbursements
and expenses.
Occupational diseases — Proximate causation.

Tab 2

APPENDIX 2
FINDINGS OF FACT CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER
(R. 224-235)

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No.

92-926 & 92-1132
*

JOSHUA J. NEWTON, Minor Dependent*
Stepson of, and SHAYLA MARIA
*
PHILLIPSEN, STEPHEN BURDELL
*
PHILLIPSEN, and JAZMIN DANIELLE *
PHILLIPSEN, Minor Dependent
*
Children of ROBERT T. PHILLIPSEN,*
Deceased,
*
Applicants,

*

FINDINGS OF FACT

*

vs.

*

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

*

MARK BUNDY dba MARK BUNDY
TRUCKING (UNINSURED), B B & B
TRANSPORTATION and/or WORKERS
COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH,
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS FUND,
Defendants.

*
*
*
*
*

AND ORDER

*
*

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

HEARING:

Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on April 22,
1993, at 1:00 o,clock p.m.; same being pursuant to
Order and Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Timothy C. Allen, Presiding Administrative Law
Judge.

APPEARANCES:

Applicants were represented by Kevin Sutterfield,
Attorney at Law.
Defendant, Mark Bundy was present and represented by
Stuart Weed, Attorney at Law.
Defendant, B B & B Transportation was represented by
Irene Warr, Attorney at Law.
The defendant, Workers Compensation Fund of Utah,
was represented by Richard G. Sumsion, Attorney at
Law.
The Uninsured Employers Fund was represented by
Thomas C. Sturdy, Attorney at Law.
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At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the matter was
taken under advisement by the Administrative Law Judge. Being
fully advised in the premises, the Administrative Law Judge is
prepared to enter the following

FINDINGS OF FACT:
At the outset of the evidentiary hearing, the Workers
Compensation Fund of Utah, by and through counsel, notified the
Administrative Law Judge that it and its insured, B B & B
Transportation, were stipulating that B B & B Transportation was
the statutory employer of the decedent, Robert T. Phillipsen. In
light of the Stipulation, the litigation of the statutory employer
issue was thus rendered moot. However, there remains an issue with
respect to whether or not B B & B Transportation, in addition to
being the statutory employer of the decedent was, in fact, his sole
employer. Dispositive Motions had previously been filed by the
parties, which were taken under advisement pending -the conclusion
of the evidentiary hearing. Therefore, the issues have been well
briefed. As will appear from the discussion which will follow, the
Administrative Law Judge found and concluded that the decedent, Mr.
Phillipsen, had two employers at the time of his death, his common
law or actual employer, Mark Bundy, and his statutory employer,
B B & B Transportation.
The decedent herein, Robert T. Phillipsen, was driving a truck
owned by Bundy Trucking and leased to B B & B Transportation when
he was involved in a fatal industrial accident on May 10, 1991. At
the time of his death, there were four minor children living in his
home, who were dependent upon him for support, namely, Joshua J.
Newton, (DOB: 2-22-85), Shayla Marie Phillipsen, (DOB: 7-15-86),
Stephen Burdell Phillipsen, (DOB: 4-7-88), and Jazmin Danielle
Phillipsen, (DOB: 1-17-92).
The decedent was also married to
Melanie Phillipsen, who was living with him at the time of his
death. Melanie Phillipsen filed a claim for workers compensation
benefits with the Industrial Commission on August 3, 1992.
Thereafter, the Uninsured Employers Fund, by and through counsel,
filed a Motion to Dismiss Mrs. Phillipsen's claim on the grounds
that she did not file the same within one year of the decedent's
date of death as required by §35-1-98. The Administrative Law
Judge in a letter Order of November 16, 1992, granted the Motion to
Dismiss on behalf of the Uninsured Employers Fund as to Melanie
Phillipsen. However, the Administrative Law Judge also found that
the effects of §35-1-98, are tolled by §78-12-36, with respect to
the minor dependent children of the deceased. No appeal having
been taken of that Order, that Order is now the final award of the
Commission.
Based on that Order, the claim was styled as is
presently provided.
Ji

022ii

ROBERT T. PHILLIPSEN, DECEASED
ORDER
PAGE THREE
At the time of his death, the decedent was averaging $1,978
per month in wages. Based on the foregoing, the dependents of the
deceased would be entitled to a base compensation award of $305.00
per week when rounded to the nearest whole dollar.
When the
dependents allowance is added to the award, the applicants are then
entitled to the maximum award provided by law of $309.00 per week.
Since there are four dependents of the deceased, each child shall
be entitled to an award of $77.25 per week. The benefits to be
awarded to the minor dependents shall be placed in trust accounts
at the Mountain America Credit Union, and shall be disbursed only
upon a written showing of need. Upon reaching the age of eighteen,
the balance found remaining in each account shall become the sole
property of that child. The total award for the initial six years
shall be $96,408.00, which would entitle each child to an award of
$24,102.00 for the first six years of benefits.
As intimated earlier, the remaining issues in this case
involve whether or not the applicant was the sole employee of
B B & B Transportation, and if not, if the Uninsured Employers Fund
is jointly and severally liable along with Mr. Bundy and the
statutory employer, for the benefits in this case. The defendant,
Mark Bundy, points to the Lease Agreement as between himself and
the defendant, B B & B Transportation as support for his position
that B B & B Transportation was the sole employer, in fact, of the
applicant. As a related issue, Bundy also argues that because of
Exhibit D-3, which is an Independent Contractor Agreement between
Bundy and the deceased, Bundy urges that the applicant was also an
independent contractor.
That Agreement in its Recital section indicates that the
contract is being made between the owner, Mark Bundy, and Mr.
Phillipsen, who is denominated as a contractor.
The Recital
section indicates that the owner owns certain trucks and trucking
equipment and operates a truck ownership business and that he
desires Phillipsen as the contractor, to perform the services of
trucking and truck driving.
For these services, the Agreement
provides that the decedent would receive 20% of the revenue
generated by the load taken, and that he would receive dispatches
from B B & B Transportation. The Agreement in its "Relationship
of Parties" section states the following provision: "The parties
intend this contract to create an employer - independent contractor
relationship." The Agreement concludes that the decedent would
hold Bundy harmless from any and all liability for workers
compensation- or any other liability which might be subsequently
imposed on Bundy.
This particular provision of the contract
appears to be void on its face since it would appear to run
contrary to the provisions of §35-1-90, Utah Code Annotated. That
section provides that: "No agreement by an employee to waive his
rights to compensation under this title shall be valid."
The
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Agreement goes on to provide that Bundy will supply the truck and
equipment, and will provide for all maintenance for the equipment.
In reviewing the Agreement and the evidence on the file, it
would appear that there was no negotiation of the various terms of
that Agreement. It would further appear that the parties did not
possess equal bargaining power, in that Bundy owned the truck,
while the only asset that Phillipsen possessed was his ability to
drive truck.
This issue of the effect of an independent contractor
agreement executed by a driver has been previously addressed by the
Utah Supreme Court in the matter of Harry L. Young & Sons v.
Ashton, P2d 316 (Utah 1975) .
In the Ashton case, the Court
addressed the legal effect of an "Independent Contractor Agreement"
similar to that executed by Bundy and the decedent in this matter.
There the Court indicated:
It should be had in mind that the issue is not
whether Dennis A. Ashton was an employee of
Young in the dictionary sense, nor is it to be
determined solely from the terms used.
Particularly, its character is not necessarily
fixed by the fact that the agreement recites
that it is not an employer - employee
relationship, but is that of an independent
contractor. The question of entitlement to
workman's compensation depends on whether the
facts and circumstances bring him within the
requirements of the Workmens Compensation Act.
The applicable statutory provision which governs this case is
found in §35-1-42 (5)(a), which provides:
*

5) (a)

*

*

If any person who is an employer procures
any work to be done wholly or in part for
him by a contractor over whose work he
retains supervision or control, and this
work is a part or process in the trade or
business of the employer, the contractor,
all persons employed
by him, all
subcontractors under him, and all persons
employed by any of these subcontractors,
are considered employees of the original
employer.

ROBERT T. PHILLIPSEN, DECEASED
ORDER
PAGE FIVE
Section 42, in subsection (2)(b) defines the term independent
contractor:
"Independent contractor" means any person
engaged in the performance of any work for
another who, while so engaged, is independent of
the employer in all that pertains to the execution
of the work, is not subject to the rule or control
of the employer, is engaged only in the performance
of a definite job or piece of work, and is
subordinate to the employer only in effecting a
result in accordance with the employer's design.
The Court in Ashton went on to state:
Speaking in generality: an employee is one who
is hired and paid a salary, a wage, or at a
fixed rate, to perform the employer's work as
directed by the employer and who is subject to
a comparatively high degree of control in
performing those duties.
In contrast, an
independent contractor is one who is engaged
to do some particular project or piece of
work, usually for a set total sum, who may do
the job in his own way, subject to only
minimal restrictions or controls and is
responsible
only
for
its
satisfactory
completion.
To provide guidance in this area, the Court set forth the
following parameters:
The main facts to be considered as bearing on
the relationship here are: (1) Whatever
covenants or agreements exist concerning the
right of direction and control over the
employee, whether express or implied; (2) The
right to hire and fire; (3) The method of
payment, i.e., whether in wages or fees, as
compared to payment for a complete job or
project; and (4) The furnishing of the
equipment. (Citation omitted).
In applying the foregoing legal requirements to the facts of
this case, I find that as the Court found in Ashton, that although
the parties recited in their lease that they had an independent
contractor relationship, the employee, Mr. Phillipsen, had no real
choice. Mr. Phillipsen was paid 20% of the revenue generated for
the load that he took, and there was no evidence offered to
indicate that he had any negotiation or bargaining power whatsoever
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with respect to that term of the agreement. Further, the truck Mr.
Phillipsen was driving was owned by Mark Bundy.
There was no
provision in the contract whereby Mr. Phillipsen could refuse to
haul a load or an oversized load for that matter. Further, Mr.
Bundy had the governor mechanism repaired on the truck that Mr.
Phillipsen was driving, so that Mr. Phillipsen could not exceed a
certain speed limit. With respect to the relationship between Mr.
Bundy and Mr. Phillipsen, Mr. Bundy also retained the power of
control over the decedent. Although the Independent Contractor
Agreement did not retain that power, Mr. Bundy retained that power
in a separate lease agreement he executed in 1990, with B B & B
Transportation.
In that agreement, Mr. Bundy was to furnish a
driver and was to "have full and exclusive responsibility for. . .
hiring, setting the wages, hours and working conditions of and
adjusting the grievances of, supervising, training, disciplining
and firing of all drivers. . . ", 1990 (Lease at ? 3 (A)).
Therefore, the Administrative Law Judge finds that this case
represents the fact situation anticipated by the Supreme Court when
it made its observation that:
The employer wanted the "best of two possible
worlds." On the one hand to have a person
rendering a service over whom he can maintain
a high degree of control, and at the same time
give the person the status of an independent
contractor to avoid the responsibilities he
would have to an employee.
Based on the foregoing discussion, I find and conclude that
Robert T. Phillipsen was an employee of Mark Bundy Trucking on May
10, 1991, when he sustained his fatal compensable industrial
accident.
As indicated just previously, there was a separate Lease
Agreement as between Mark Bundy and B B & B Transportation. That
Agreement provided that Bundy, as the owner-operator of certain
trailers and 18 wheel tractors, would furnish that equipment to
B B & B Transportation.
That Agreement provided that B B & B
Transportation would "Have complete care, custody and control of
both the leased equipment and the drivers furnished therewith. . ."
(Lease at f 3) .
That Agreement also provided that B B & B
Transportation would furnish the general and workers compensation
coverage (Lease at f 10,) and would require that all drivers check
in with B B & B Transportation before making any trip (Lease at
f 11). The agreement went on to provide that Bundy would pay all
equipment expenses including fuel, oil, repairs, taxes and license
fees (Lease at J 3 (D)) . And that Bundy shall: "Have full and
exclusive responsibility for. . . hiring, setting the wages, etc.,
of the drivers." Based on the foregoing provisions of the Lease
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Agreement between himself and B B & B Transportation, Bundy urges
that B B & B Transportation was the sole employer of the decedent.
However, by the very terms of his Lease Agreement with B B S
B Transportation, Bundy retained the right of control over the
activities of the decedent, Phillipsen. The surviving spouse of
the decedent testified that she took approximately ten trips with
the decedent and on each of those trips, the decedent was required
to report in to B B & B Transportation on a very regular basis
concerning his whereabouts at all times. The payment arrangement
between the parties was such that B B & B Transportation would pay
Bundy 85% of the revenue generated for the load taken by the
decedent, and Bundy, in turn, would pay Phillipsen his 20% share of
the revenue generated.
Therefore, under the terms of the 1990
Lease Agreement, Bundy had the right of control over Phillipsen,
and he also had the right to hire and fire Phillipsen.
In
addition, Bundy paid Phillipsen's wages, and he owned and leased
the tractor and trailer used by Phillipsen in the performance of
his duties. Based on these factors, and in reliance on the Supreme
Court decision in the matter of Charles Kinne v. Industrial
Commission, 609 P2d 926 (Utah 1980) , I find and conclude that Mark
Bundy is jointly and severally liable with B B & B Transportation
for the compensation award in this matter. I find, as the Court
did in Kinne, that: "An employee, for the purpose of workmen's
compensation may have two employers."
One final issue involves the relationship of the Uninsured
Employers Fund and whether or not it has liability for benefits in
this matter, since the uninsured employer, Mark Bundy, has been
assessed with joint and several liability. The Uninsured Employers
Fund relies upon its reading of §35-1-107 (1) , to conclude that
they have no liability. Section 35-1-107 (1), states:
There is created an Uninsured Employers Fund.
The Fund has the purpose of assisting in the
payment of workers compensation benefits to
any person entitled to them, if that person's
employer is individuallv-iointly, or severally
liable to pay the benefits, but becomes or is
insolvent, appoints or has appointed a
receiver,
or
otherwise
does
not
have
sufficient funds, insurance, sureties, or
other security to cover workers compensation
liabilities. If it becomes necessary to pay
benefits, the Fund
is liable for all
obligations of the employer as set forth in
Title 35, Chapters 1 and 2, with the
exceptions of penalties on those obligations.
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The Uninsured Employers Fund takes the position that it is
only secondarily liable, and that the statutory employer, B B & B
Transportation is primarily liable for benefits, and that the
Uninsured Employers Fund only has liability in the event that the
statutory employer and the uninsured employer are unable to pay
benefits.
That reading of §35-1-107, seems to give no effect
whatsoever to the 1988 amendment to §35-1-107. The 1988 amendment
struck the qualifier every which appeared before employer in §35-1107. In the pre-1988 version of §107, the Act provided that the
Uninsured Employers Fund had no liability unless every employer of
the applicant was insolvent. The Legislature in the 1988 amendment
specifically removed the word every from that statute. I can only
conclude that the intent of the Legislature in removing the word
every was to overcome the effects of the decision in Jacobsen v.
Industrial Commission, 738 P2d 658, (Utah 1987).
In that case, the Uninsured Employers Fund and the Workers
Compensation Fund of Utah litigated whether or not every employer
of the applicant had to be insolvent before the Uninsured Employers
Fund would have liability. In that case, the Court found that the
term every meant what it said, and, as such, the Workers
Compensation Fund of Utah was assessed liability in that case,
since only the uninsured employer was insolvent. The Administrative Law Judge can only presume that in order to overcome the
ruling in the Jacobsen case, the Legislature, in its infinite
wisdom, removed the requirement that every employer be insolvent
before Uninsured Employer Fund liability would be triggered. To
adopt the position of the Uninsured Employers Fund which was urged
at hearing, would mean that the Administrative Law Judge by
administrative fiat and decision would repeal the 1988 amendment to
§3 5-1-107. That step this Administrative Law Judge will not take.
Therefore, I find that based on my reading of §35-1-107, it would
appear that the Uninsured Employers Fund has joint and several
liability with the statutory employer upon the uninsured employer
being unable to pay benefits in a case.
Applying the foregoing reasoning to this case, I find that the
death benefits to be awarded to the minor dependents shall be paid
in the first instance by the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, and
the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah shall be entitled to 50%
reimbursement from Mark Bundy. In the event Mark Bundy is without
sufficient assets or surities to pay his portion of the award, then
the Uninsured Employers Fund, pursuant to §107 of the Act, shall
then step in and make the payments in Bundy's stead.
The applicants herein, have had the benefit of legal counsel
in these proceedings. As a result, counsel is entitled to a fee
for his services. The attorneys fee rule provides that the maximum
fee payable on a workers compensation case is $7,500.00. Based on
the amount recovered for the applicants, counsel is entitled to the
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maximum fee. That fee shall be deducted equally from each of the
applicant's benefits, which will result in a deduction of $1,875.00
from each child's accrued award.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
Robert T. Phillipsen was an employee of Mark Bundy dba Mark
Bundy Trucking on May 10, 1991, when he sustained his fatal
industrial accident.
In addition, Robert T. Phillipsen was a
statutory employee of B B & B Transportation on May 10, 1991, when
he sustained his fatal industrial accident. B B & B Transportation
and Mark Bundy are jointly and severally liable for the death
benefits due and owing to the applicants as the result of the
industrial accident sustained by Robert T. Phillipsen on May 10,
1991, during the course and scope of his employment. Pursuant to
§35-1-107, the Uninsured Employers Fund is jointly and severally
liable with the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah for death
benefits in this matter in the event, Mark Bundy is insolvent or
lacks sufficient assets or sureties to satisfy his portion of the
award in this matter.
ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Mark Bundy and/or B B & B
Transportation/Workers Compensation Fund of Utah pay Mountain
America Credit Union, $24,102.00, for deposit in share account
#74787-2, which account has as its owner, Joshua J. Newton. No
disbursements shall be made from the account without the written
authorization of the Commission upon a showing of need.
The
benefits awarded herein shall commence effective May 11, 1991, at
the rate of $77.25 per week, and shall terminate on or about May 2,
1997.
Accrued amounts shall be paid in a lump sum including
interest of 8% per annum. The defendants shall deduct $1,875.00
from the accrued award to Joshua, and shall remit the same to Kevin
Sutterfield, attorney for the applicants, for services rendered in
this matter.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mark Bundy and/or B B & B
Transportation/Workers Compensation Fund of Utah pay Mountain
America Credit Union, $24,102.00, for deposit in share account
#74788-0, which account has as its owner, Shayla M. Phillipsen. No
disbursements shall be made from the account without the written
authorization of the Commission upon a showing of need.
The
benefits awarded herein shall commence effective May 11, 1991, at
the rate of $77.25 per week, and shall terminate on or about May 2,
1997.
Accrued amounts shall be paid in a lump sum including
interest of 8% per annum. The defendants shall deduct $1,875.00
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from the accrued award to Shay la, and shall remit the same to Kevin
Sutterfield, attorney for the applicants, for services rendered in
this matter.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mark Bundy and/ or B B & B
Transportation/Workers Compensation Fund of Utah pay Mountain
America Credit Union, $24,102.00, for deposit in share account
#74789-8, which account has as its owner, Stephen B. Phillipsen.
No disbursements shall be made from the account without the written
authorization of the Commission upon a showing of need. The
benefits awarded herein shall commence effective May 11, 1991, at
the rate of $77.25 per week, and shall terminate on or about May 2,
1997.
Accrued amounts shall be paid in a lump sum including
interest of 8% per annum. The defendants shall deduct $1,875.00
from the accrued award to Stephen, and shall remit the same to
Kevin Sutterfield, attorney for the applicants, for services
rendered in this matter.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mark Bundy and/or B B & B
Transportation/Workers Compensation Fund of Utah pay Mountain
America Credit Union, $24,102.00, for deposit in share account
#74790-6, which account has as its owner, Jazmin D. Phillipsen. No
disbursements shall be made from the account without the written
authorization of the Commission upon a showing of need.
The
benefits awarded herein shall commence effective May 11, 1991, at
the rate of $77.25 per week, and shall terminate on or about May 2,
1997.
Accrued amounts shall be paid in a lump sum including
interest of 8% per annum. The defendants shall deduct $1,875.00
from the accrued award to Jazmin, and shall remit the same to Kevin
Sutterfield, attorney for the applicants, for services rendered in
this matter.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mountain America Credit Union mail
quarterly statements to the children c/o Melanie Phillipsen, 148
West 100 North, #A-1, Nephi, UT 84648. Mrs. Phillipsen shall
furnish Mountain America Credit Union with social security numbers
for the children to facilitate the reporting of interest income,
and she is responsible for the filing of any required income tax
returns.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, Mark Bundy and/or
B B & B Transportation/Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, shall pay
Kevin Sutterfield, attorney for the applicants, the sum of
$7,500.00, for services rendered in this matter, the same to be
deducted from the aforesaid awards to the children as previously
provided.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that on or about March 1, 1997, the
Workers Compensation Fund shall send Declaration of Dependency
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forms to Melanie Phillipsen prior to the termination of the
benefits awarded to the children herein. Thereafter, the children
will be entitled to continuing death benefits from the defendants
less an offset for 50% of the Social Security death benefits
received by them at that time.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the benefits awarded herein shall
be paid in full in the first instance by the Workers Compensation
Fund of Utah. The Workers Compensation Fund shall thereafter be
entitled to reimbursement for 50% of the benefits paid in this
matter from Mark Bundy on a quarterly basis. In the event Mark
Bundy is without sufficient assets or sureties or is insolvent and
is therefore unable to pay his 50% portion of the benefits in this
matter, then the Uninsured Employers Fund shall make those payments
for Bundy, and they shall reimburse the Workers Compensation Fund
of Utah on a quarterly basis.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and
subject to review or appeal.

the
the
and
not

aien
administrative Law Judge

Certified this £ rt
May, 1993.

Patricia 0. Ashby /
Commission Secretary

day of
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Murray, UT 84107
Thomas Sturdy
Attorney at Law
Uninsured Employers Fund
Richard G. Sumsion
Attorney at Law
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah
P. 0. Box 57929
SLC, UT 84157
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

By ikXjJ-yY^

fhLmAa\^/r\vr\

Wilma Burrows
Adjudication Division
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APPENDIX 3
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR REVIEW
(R. 224-275-281)

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6600
JOSHUA J. NEWTON, Minor Dependent
Stepson of, and SHAYLA MARIA
PHILLIPSON, STEPHEN BURDELL
PHILLIPSON, and JAZMIN DANIELLE
PHILLIPSON, Minor Dependent
Children of ROBERT T. PHILLIPSON,
Deceased.

*
*
*
*
*
*
*

vs.

*

MARK BUNDY dba MARK BUNDY TRUCKING *
(uninsured), BB & B TRANSPORTATION *
and/or WORKERS' COMPENSATION FUND *
OF UTAH, UNINSURED EMPLOYERS7 FUND,*
Respondents.

ORDER
GRANTING
MOTION FOR REVIEW

Case Nos. 92-926
& 92-1132

*

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

The Industrial Commission of Utah ("Commission") reviews the
motion for review of the applicant in the above captioned matter,
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-82.53 and Section 63
-46b-12.
The minor dependent children of Robert T. Phillipson
("applicants") filed a claim for workers' compensation death
benefits pursuant to the industrially caused death of their father.
BB & B Transportation ("BB & B") stipulated that it was the
statutory employer of Mr. Phillipson. The administrative law judge
("ALJ") found that the Mark Bundy dba Bundy Trucking ("Bundy") was
Mr. Phillipson's common law or actual employer and ordered that the
liability for the payment of benefits be shared jointly and
severally between Bundy and BB & B. The ALJ ordered that benefits
to be paid initially by the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah
("WCFU"), BB & B's insurer, with a right to recover 50% of the
benefits paid from Bundy. If Bundy does not have sufficient assets
to pay his 50% portion of benefits, the Uninsured Employers' Fund
("UEF") was ordered to make the payments for Bundy.
Respondent Bundy filed a motion for review asserting that BB
& B was the sole employer of Phillipson and that Phillipson was an
independent contractor to Bundy. The UEF filed a motion for review
of that portion of the order which ordered the UEF to pay benefits
if Bundy is unable to pay his share of the award.
We hereby adopt the findings of fact contained in the
administrative law judge's order of May 6, 1993 with the following
additional finding:
1.
Phillipson was performing the work of BB & B on the date of
his fatal industrial accident.

i\f&**t
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I. WAS BB & B PHILLIPSON'S SOLE EMPLOYER?
Bundy argues that BB & B was Phillipson's sole employer and,
therefore, solely liable for his workers7 compensation benefits.
It appears that the Lease Agreement between Bundy and BB & B
provides that Bundy lease a truck and loan a driver to BB & B. A
loaned employee may be the employee of either the general employer
or the special employer depending upon the circumstances of the
case.1 According to Professor Larson, the general employer will be
presumed liable unless it can be shown that the special employer
has been substituted for the general employer. To overcome the
presumption, the evidence must show:
(1) a contract of hire
between the special employer and the employee; (2) proof that the
work being done at the time of injury was essentially the work of
the special employer; and (3) proof that the special employer
assumed the right to control the details of the work. Id. at 8457.
Utah courts have determined that the right to supervision and
control is the most important factor for determining whether an
employee/employer relationship exists.2 Utah law further provides
that a contract between an employee and special employer may be
implied by conduct of the parties.3
The decedent and Bundy entered into an agreement whereby
decedent
agreed
to Mreceiv[e] dispatches
from BB & B
Transportation." The agreement was entered on January 22, 1991.
The decedent's spouse testified that she took approximately ten
trips with the decedent and that on each of those trips the
decedent was required to report in to BB & B on a regular basis.
The evidence indicates that the decedent regularly drove for BB &
B and agreed to an employee/employer relationship between himself
and BB & B.
The Lease Agreement stated that BB & B was an "irregular route
for hire carrier [with ICC authorization to transport] General
Commodities between points in the Continental United States." The
decedent regularly operated a truck transporting commodities for BB
& B and was doing so at the time of his fatal industrial accident.
Therefore, at the time of his accident, decedent was performing the
work of BB & B and not Bundy.

1

See LARSON'S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 48.00. (1992 Ed.)

2

Harry L. Young & Sons, Inc. v. Ashton, 538 P.2d 316 (Utah
1975) .
3

Bambrouah v. Bethers. 552 P.2d 1286, 1292 (Utah 1976).

ROBERT T. PHILLIPSON
ORDER
PAGE THREE
The Lease Agreement between Bundy and BB & B provided that
Bundy "shall furnish a driver or drivers for each unit of the
Leased Equipment" and that the Lessee (BB & B) "shall have the

complete

care,

custody

and control

of both the Leased Equipment and

drivers
furnished
therewith..."
(emphasis added). The agreement
further provides that Bundy "shall have full and exclusive
responsibility for:
(A) hiring, setting the wages, hours and
working conditions of and adjusting the grievances of, supervising,
training, disciplining and firing of all drivers..." Thus, BB & B
had the ultimate right to control the decedent's work. Bundy's
role was either that of a supervisor for BB & B or an employer who
retained some control over his loaned employee. Bundy's failure to
relinquish all control over his loaned employee does not affect the
application of the loaned servant doctrine.4
BB & B exercised the right to control the loaned employees
that was granted in the Lease Agreement.
BB & B required the
decedent to report to its dispatcher each day before 10:00 a.m.
Mountain Time and to haul only loads that BB & B approved. BB & B
also had the right to refuse to use any driver provided by Bundy.
These factors support the conclusion that BB & B exercised the
right to control the work of the decedent.
The Lease Agreement further provided that BB & B would provide
workers' compensation insurance.
Therefore, a preponderance of
the evidence supports the conclusion that decedent was a loaned
employee in the service of BB & B at the time of his fatal
industrial accident.6
Therefore, the liability for payment of
4

"It has never been held by this Court that for the loaned
servant doctrine to apply, the original employer must completely
surrender all control over his loaned employee."
Bambrouah v.
Bethers at 1292.
5

"It is not unreasonable to hold a party responsible for
obligations he assumes by contract."
Kinne v. Industrial
Commission, 609 P.2d 926 (Utah 1980).
6

This case may be distinguished from Kinne v. Industrial
Commission, 609 P.2d 926 (Utah 1980) , in which both the truck owner
and lessee were held liable for benefits. In Kinne, the employee
was injured while performing truck maintenance, a job which
benefitted both the truck owner and the lessee. In the present
case, decedent was performing the work of the lessee at the time of
his injury. The contract in Kinne provided that the lessor would
provide workers' compensation insurance and be responsible for the
direction and control of the drivers. In this case, the contract
provided that the lessee would provide workers' compensation
insurance and retain the ultimate right to direct and control the
rv/\0*JV"*
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workers' compensation benefits rests solely with BB & B and its
insurance carrier, the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah.
CONCLUSION OF LAW:
We conclude that decedent was a loaned employee solely in the
service of BB & B at the time of the fatal industrial accident.
Therefore, Bundy and, by extension, the Uninsured Employers' Fund,
are not liable for any portion of the benefits awarded.
We will not address the additional issues raised by the
parties because they are rendered moot by our decision above.
ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the findings of fact of the
administrative law judge are adopted as amended above.
IT
IS
FURTHER
ORDERED
that
the
order
of
the
administrative law judge dated May 6, 1993 be amended to read as
follows:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that BB & B Transportation
/Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah pay Mountain America
Credit Union , $24,102.00 for deposit in share account
#74787-2, which account has as its owner Joshua J.
Newton. No disbursements shall be made from the account
without the written authorization of the Commission upon
a showing of need.
The benefits awarded herein shall
commence effective May 11, 1991, at the rate of $77.25
per week, and shall terminate on or about May 2, 1997.
Accrued amounts shall be paid in a lump sum including
interest of 8% per annum. The defendants shall deduct
$1,875.00 from the accrued award to Joshua, and shall
remit the same to Kevin Sutterfield, attorney for the
applicants, for services rendered in this matter.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that BB & B Transportation
/Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah pay Mountain America
Credit Union , $24,102.00 for deposit in share account
#74788-0, which account has as its owner Shayla M.
Phillipson.
No disbursements shall be made from the
account without the written authorization of the
Commission upon a showing of need* The benefits awarded
herein shall commence effective May 11, 1991, at the rate
of $77.25 per week, and shall terminate on or about May
2, 1997. Accrued amounts shall be paid in a lump sum
drivers.
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including interest of 8% per annum. The defendants shall
deduct $1,875.00 from the accrued award to Shayla, and
shall remit the same to Kevin Sutterfield, attorney for
the applicants, for services rendered in this matter.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that BB & B Transportation
/Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah pay Mountain America
Credit Union , $24,102.00 for deposit in share account
#74789-8, which account has as its owner Stephen B.
Phillipson.
No disbursements shall be made from the
account without the written authorization of the
Commission upon a showing of need. The benefits awarded
herein shall commence effective May 11, 1991, at the rate
of $77.25 per week, and shall terminate on or about May
2, 1997. Accrued amounts shall be paid in a lump sum
including interest of 8% per annum. The defendants shall
deduct $1,875.00 from the accrued award to Stephen, and
shall remit the same to Kevin Sutterfield, attorney for
the applicants, for services rendered in this matter.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that BB & B Transportation
/Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah pay Mountain America
Credit Union , $24,102.00 for deposit in share account
#74790-6, which account has as its owner Jazmin D.
Phillipson.
No disbursements shall be made from the
account without the written authorization of the
Commission upon a showing of need. The benefits awarded
herein shall commence effective May 11, 1991, at the rate
of $77.25 per week, and shall terminate on or about May
2, 1997. Accrued amounts shall be paid in a lump sum
including interest of 8% per annum. The defendants shall
deduct $1,875.00 from the accrued award to Jazmin, and
shall remit the same to Kevin Sutterfield, attorney for
the applicants, for services rendered in this matter.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mountain America Credit
Union mail quarterly statements to the children c/o
Melanie Phillipson, 148 West 100 North, #A-1, Nephi, UT
84648. Mrs. Phillipson shall furnish Mountain America
Credit Union with social security numbers for the
children to facilitate the reporting of interest income,
and she is responsible for filing any required income tax
returns.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, B B & B
Transportation /Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah, shall
pay Kevin Sutterfield, Attorney for the applicant, the
sum of $7500.00, for services rendered in this matter,
the same to be deducted from the aforesaid awards to the
children as previously provided.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that on or about March 1,
1997, the Workers' Compensation Fund shall send
Declaration of Dependency forms to Melanie Phillipson
prior to the termination of the benefits awarded to the
children herein.
Thereafter, the children will be
entitled to continuing death benefits from the defendants
less an offset for 50% of the Social Security death
benefits received by them at that time.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of
the foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty
(30) days of the date hereof, specifying in detail the
particular errors and objections, and, unless so filed,
this Order shall be final and not subject to review or
appeal.
DATED this /^y^/*%v^l day of

^v^u

1994.

^SAin 4 A
Thomas R. Carlson
Commissioner

Any request for reconsideration by the Industrial Commission
must be filed within 20 days of the date of this Order. A request
for reconsideration is not required prior to filing an appeal to
the Utah Court of Appeals. An appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals
must be filed within 30 days of the date of this Order.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, Adell Butler-Mitchell, certify that I did mail by prepaid
first class postage, except as noted below, a copy of the ORDER
GRANTING MOTION FOR REVIEW in the case of JOSHUA J. NEWTON & SHAYLA
MARIA PHILLIPSON, Case Number 92-926 & 92-1132, on .ajH^day of
n
Ir) i^t^cJ-19_T£ to the following:
MELANIE PHILLIPSEN
148 WEST 100 NORTH #A-1
NEPHI, UTAH 84648
KEVIN SUTTERFIELD
P O BOX 778
PROVO, UTAH 84603
MARK BUNDY TRUCKING
P O BOX 192
NEPHI, UTAH 846548
STUART WEED
60 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH

SUITE 1800
84111-1004

B B & B TRANSPORTATION
P O BOX 7061
MURRAY, UTAH 84107
RICHARD G. SUMSION
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH
THOMAS STURDY
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS FUND
CINDY PETERSON
MOUNTAIN AMERICA CREDIT UNION
P O BOX 45001
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84145
T. C. ALLEN
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE

Adell But^r-Mitchell
Paralegal
General Counsel's Office
Industrial Commission of Utah
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APPENDIX 4
LEASE AGREEMENT
(EX. D-1, R. 329-340, 370)

[AHSPOnTATIOH, I N C .

LEASE AOREEHBHr, Exaouted this /<£ day VZ^^/LLM.'U/

A*98 by and

between BB4B, INC./dbaBB&B TRAtflPORTAIIOH, 1HC. (Lesssc), a corporation
of Utah, 4154 8o» 300 West, Hurray, Ut 84107 and rn.
Of
(laaamO „

VIT1C8SRH1

WHEREAS, LESSEE i s an irregular rout* for-hire carrier holding
operating authority issued by the Interstate Caauseree Ooudsaion (ICC)
i n Docket # HC174343 (and tub numbers thereunder), authorising the
transportation of General Coamoditlea betueen points in the Continental United States) and
W1EREA3, Sasior control* a actor Tehiola whioh i t available for
Lessee'a use and suitable for transportation of the specified ooaoscdltiea
authorised for transportation by Lessee f and
WHEREAS Lessor desires to lease such vehicle to Leasee of & longter* basis and Lessee desires to lease such Motor vehicle fro« Lessor)
HOW', 'THEREFORE, in consideration of aufaual agreeaante and undertakings contained herein, and on the tarts and conditions expressed belpv
the parties hereto COY-riant and agree as followst
1# LEASE OF EQUIPMENT* Lessor hereby leases to Leasee and Lessee
hereby aooepts fro» Lessor, *2 tractor (a) and -te—i .se»i-.trailer(B)
(oolleotivly the "Leased Eqidpnsnt") acre fully described on Exhibit RAV
attaohed hereto and mde a part of by reference, for the tare specified
herein, beginning ^liv/ity
/6> .19%? .
2. EXCLUSIVE CONTROL IN LSB3EE« The Leased Equipment i s to be
engaged exclusively in the service of the Lessee, and the goods transported therein shall be transported pursuant to the direotion of and
under exclusive oontrol and supervision of the Lessee.
'XK^^
EXHIBIT E-1 of ,2

'NDUSTRIALCOMMISS.OM -

' ^

SMI IANSPORTATION, INC.

P.O. SOX 70S 1
4IM SOUTH 900 EAST
UUfiRAY, UTAH UW
(B01)MEMM2

page 2
3» EXCLUSIVE COHTROL IH IES3EE. Lei SOT shall furnish t driver or
drirtrB far each unit of the Leased Squipeenfe. lessee shall hare the complete care, custody and control of both the Leased Squiprent anl drivers
furniehed therewith) provided however that Lessor shall have full eld
exclusive responsibility for)
(A) hiring, setting the wages, hours and working conditions of and
ad Justing the grievanoes of (Supervising) training) disciplining) and firing
of a l l drivers) drivers helpers and other workers necessary for the perfor oenc e of Lessor's obligations unier the terse of this Agree rent) which
driver, driver's helpers and other workers are,anl shall be, either the
pnplcy are a of the Lessor or under the direot econoedo oontroi of the Lessor)
(B) paying all operating and related expenses far the Leased Bquiprtnt,
including a l l expenses of fuel) oil and repairs to the Leased Equipment, road
taxes, tdleage taxes, fines far perking) moving or overweight violations)
licenses, paradts or any other levies or aseesaneata based upon the operation of Leased Equipment, and;
(0) paying 'and reporting as required by an •aploytr, as explained
Mare fully below* Subject in each ease to any rsqulreaents which say be
placed upon Lessee by applicable statutes, and regulations promulgated
thereunder,.It i s understood by the parties that soaa i t ana creating
the foregoing expenses nay be arranged far by the Lessee far Isssar, as
expressly'described below) and Lessor shall reiaburse Lessee therefore
instead' of paying suoh.expenses directly y as in autually agreed by the
parties froi tine to tine.
*• HAHffgffA«CB AM COMPLIANCE MQlttMHEMTS. The parties ackncvlege
that Leasees oparations are Subject to regulation by tbe federal
governwnt through the ICG and the U«3« Department of Transportation (DOT)
and by various state and local governments. Lessor shall have tbe responsibility to Lessee far compliance with suoh regulatory requirements relating
to the operation of the Leased Equipment) subject at all times
to verification by Lessee by)
(A) *dntaining the Leased Equipment pursuant to the Agreement in
the*manner required by all applicable regulations)

»0&1I

-

TflANSPORTATION, INC,

P.O. BOX 7051
4t54SOUTH«»EA8T
MWWAY,UiAHS4l0r
(801)283-2981

(B) operating laid equipaent in aoocrd with* a l l applioabla statutes
and regulationsj
(C) providing tbereunUr only thoaa drivsri who ars qutlifisd unisr
a l l applioabla regulation! and csrtifisd tbarato by Lessee|
(D) upon autual agreeaent between Leasee ard Lessor, furnishing and
relinquishing to Lessee tho possession, oontrol and uaa of tha actor vehicle
which Leasee aay require to full f i l l requireaenta plaoad upon i t by applioabla atatutad and regulations(
(B) performance of aota naoaaaary to ooaply with tha applicable atatuss
and regulations in carrying out i t a dutiaa undar this agraaaant<
(r) aa part of i t a responsibilities hereunder, Lessor shall furnish
to Leasee a l i s t of lessor's qualified drivers and any supporting doouaantation relating tbarato that Lessee say, froa tiaa to tiao, reasonably
requaat«Lsasaa i s hereby granted tha right to request Lessor not to use an/
particular driver and, upon such request froa Lessee', Lessor shall eosply
therewith.
5« UNAUTHORIZED USB OF 1£A3BD BQUIPHBHT» Under no oireuaatanoes during
the tern of this agreeaent shall La ssor utiliie tha Leased Equipaant for
tha transportation of ooeaoditiee which Leasee ia not allowed to carry
under i t s operating authority issued by tha ICO in Docket I H0174343 ( «
any other transportation for which the Lessee i s not authorised under tha
Act and Regulations thereunder)* Tha parties aaknowledge that such unauthorised use of tha Leased Equipaent say Jeopardise Lessee* s continued operations as an authorised carrier far-hire. In the event that Lessor shall
utilise tha Leased Equipaent far suoh unauthorised service and euoh actions
result in amotions i»po*ed upon Lessee by any governaental authority,
Lessor shall b* liabls %o Lessee for &ny and all costs ard daaages, both
direct and consequential, pursuant to the provisions of Section 11 below.

4154 SOUTH 500 EAST
MUWUY,UTAHM10r

fsoiit&ussa —

rRANSPOBTATION, INC.

6. TRIP DOCUMENTATIOH TO L£3SEg. For each individual trip undertaken
by tha Leased Eqidpasnt, Lessor shall furnish to La Be* a, as Boon aa i s
practical folloving tha ooapletion of said trip, tha foliating doouasnt*
ard information)
(A) Lessee's over-the road trip import.
(B) signed delivery reoaipts and raoeipted biUa of lading)
(0) ourrant driver's chauffer's license and aadieal certificate)
(D) dritars loga (properly completed as required by applicable lav
and regulations thereunder)}
(B) eileege report (an axaaple of vhioh ia on trip sheet)
(F) original fuel tickets and state fuel reportai (which are to be
exeouted in the name of Leasee))
(Q) oopiaa of local, stats or federal inspection and violation noticest
(H) detention tisn records (on a fora acceptable to Leasee and aa
specified under applicable regulations promulgated by the ICC, i f tha trip
i s conducted under common carrier authority))
(X) suoh pr.e,tripor other vehicle inspection report as my be required
by tha ICC or DOS
With respaot to said inspection re ports t, Lessee reserve* the right to prescribe the fora on vhioh suoh inspections are to be reported* Said doouaenta
and information say be assembled and Bailed to Lessees principal office, as
identified, above) in an envelope provided by Leasee*

7. Revision of mBioffr

BILLS AND EXAMINATION

or-TAnirre m

BCHEPULSSI

Leesar may examine the schedules of actual rates and ehergee and/or tariffs
vhioh Lessee has filed with the ICC and froa vhioh the fcregoing peroentagea
of rerenue are determined at Lessee's offioea at K\% South 300 West
Murray, Ut« at any time during ncreal business hours (8 e«a. to 5 p.a. monday
through fridey), or i f i t so slaots, the Leaser amy subscribe to copies of
said schedule s and tariffs by paying to Leesee the proper ohargaa therefore*

l&I

-

ASPORTATION, I H C .

p.o.aox roe i
41W SOUTH X01AST
MURRAY, U U H 84107
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8. DEDOCHOW OF 5UH3 Wl MEIQHT LQ33 and/or DAHAOX. U a i l i reserves
the right to deduct froa any rental pay as nt due to the Lessor such sua*
te Lessee i s required to pay to any consignor or consignee for loss or
daa&ge to any coaaodities transported by the Leafed Cqidpaant* Pricr to eeldng
euoh deduction, Lessee shall furniah^to Lesser a ooaplete eopy of the
Lessee's olaia f i l e vith copies of the documentation upon v hi oh tba
•aid olaia vat paid*
9.tfARIUHttE3AH) ItCEHHIFICATIOH* In consideration of Leasee*•
agreeaent to lease the Leased Eqtdpaent, Lessor hereby warrants, covenant*
and agrees to indemnify, defend and hold Leasee harass ss froa and against
a 11 elaiae, obligations^ l o s s , dacage, penalities or expense; direct of
consequential, including without limitation a l l costs and reasonable legal
fees 9 insured, by Lessee , direetly or indirectly, froa the operation of the
Leased Bqudpaent during the tar a of this agreeaent and a l l acts cr omissions
of LessoTf i t s eaplcyees, representatives* offloers er assigns, pursuant
to the teres of this agreeaent, including, by vay of exaapla and not of
limitation, claims fines, farfotures and revocations by the ICO, the DOT
and/or any other governaantal authority, and claims by third parties
for personal injury cr property damage*
10. IMURAHCg RgQUUlEHEHTS.
(A) It i s understood and acknowledged by the parties that Lessee has
procured end aaintaina in f u l l force and effect, policies of Insurance
toverlng personal injury, (Workmen's Ooapensation Insurance), property
laaage and daaage to cargo far the benefit of the public as required by
.9 U.3.C, 8 10927) however, for the purpose of this Agreement and i n crdar t o
utisfy the requireaents of Section 9* above, the Lessor shall procure and
ointain, at i t s own expense, public l i a b i l i t y and property daaage insurance
i t h a total ecabined single 11 ait of not l s s s than $1,000,000 per oocurance,
nd a l l - r i d * cargo insurance vith a l i a b i l i t y limit of act lass than
50,000 per unit of Leased Equip cent. Lessor and i t s insurance earrier(s)
hall, by continuing end crsement, include Lessee on a l l such insurance
alleles as an edditional insured and shall, prior t o the tiaa that Lessee
ikes- poeeesaion of Leased Equlpeant hereuixlsr, furnish to the Leasee a
irtifieate er certificates eridencing such policies and/or endarseaantSa

TRANSPORTATION, INC.

P.O. BOX 7081
41M8OVTH3Q0EAST
MU* WOT, UTAH MIOf
091) 289-8582'

W
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If, however, Leaaar tnd its inaurance carrier (a) eannot provide auoh
certificates to Lessee prior to the tiaa Lessee takes possession of the
Leaa*** Equipment hereunder, in lieu of auoh insurance certificates)
Lsesor and ita insurance oarrier (a) may provide evidence of auoh insurance
by telegram or other for* of written ooaaunication actually dtlitered to
Lees" prior to taking auoh poeaaaaion, and Lessee shall by intitlod to
rely on auoh telegram or other for a of written communication* Not
withstanding the foregoing, i f Leaaee accepts auoh telagraphio or other
written fori of evidence, Leesar and ita insurance carrier (a) shall furnish
the actual certificate cr eertifioates within five (5) days of the data
of execution of this Lease Agreement* Prior to cancellation:^» non-renewal
of, av material change in aueh policies and/or endorsements, or the delation of the Leasee aa an additionally insured under auoh policies• upon
renewal or otherwise, Leaaar and i t s insurance carrier (a) shall furnish
Lessee with thirty (30) days notice in writing thereof, and Lessor's
insurance carrier (s) shall indicate of the certificate(3) provided to
Leasee i t s (their) promtae to eoaply with thia notice provision*, anything
in thift agreement to the contrary notwithstanding! for the purposes of the
parties to thia Agreement, said insurance procured and maintained by the
Lessor under this Section shall by considered and constitute primary
insurance coverage. If any of said policies and/or endorsements are
cancelled, or not renewed without notification to Leasee aa required in this
Section, this Agreement shall be deemed cancelled and terminated, as of
the date of such policy and/or endarseaent cancellation or expiration*
(b) Lessor shall'have the option of .satisfying the requiraaerita of
Section 9 above by providing insurance aa set forth in paragraph 10(A)
or by participating in the insurance coverage prograi of the Leant. In
the atent Lessor eleots to satisfy the requirments of Seetion 10 above by
participating in the exiating insurance program of Lasaee, Lessor shall
give written notioe to Lessee of the exercise of said option prior to the
tlaa Lssieo takes possession of the Laased Equipment hereunder, i f said
option i« exeroiaed, Leesor expresaly hereby autboriiea leaaee to deduct the
ooatf-of such lnaurance for each pLeae of Leased Equipment covered hereby
from a»V •oniea dua and owing by Leaaaa to Lai**.

BaB -

A S P O R T A T I O N , INC.

P.O. SOX 7061
41M80UTH 300 EAST
MUWUY.UTAHMWr
(»0l)8«3-ttU
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11. CARE. CUSTODY AM CONTROL OF EQUIPMENT.Aa provided in Seotion 1
above, i t la understood and acknowledged by both parties that tba exclusive
care, custody and oonbrol of tha Leased Bquipaent shall ba in Lasses for
the t e n of thii Agreenent. Any other provision of this Agreement notwithstanding, i t la further understood, aid acknowledged .that Leaner cannot
laaae tha Leased Bquipaent to any other person or perform actor transportation aerrice for any other parson without the prior oonsest of Leasee.
If Lessor shall, without Leaeee^s prior consent, lease tha Leased Equipment
to to any other person or perforp transportation services therewith, Las ear
shall pay to Leasee tha sua of One Hundred Dollars ($100*00) per eaoh such
ooouranoe as liquidated das&ges farbraaoh of this provision. Nothing in
this Section shell be construed, however; as superceding or •edify any of
Lessor'• other obligations or Lessee's other raaedies under this Agreeaeat.
(t) It i s understood tnl acknowledged by both parties that upon
violation of this provision in the Agreement can by i'mmsdiata cause for
termination of Lease Agreeaetit.
(b) I f Lessor, i s asked| either by Dispatoh or other authority with
Lessee, for help with loading and Lessor i s able to proaure a load. Lasses
HOST have particular load approved thru Dispatoh before commiting to or
loading said load. All Loads MUSI BE APPROVED, booked and billed thru tha
Salt Lake office, NO EXCEPTIONS Lessee agrses to work on a flat ioj for all
loads that art procured thru Lessor's own effort*, providing that Lessor
handles a l l of his ovn advancing nf money and Trip-Leasing* B B 4 B TJIANSPCRTAIIOH* IH0« under no cirauwtancaa, will advance aoney on sow one slsts
freight.
12. CHECK - IH PIPER DISPATCH» There will by a HAMATCR! eall-oheek in
before 1ChOQ AH Mountain TIDB eaoh Monday thru Friday while Lessor i s under
a dispatoh.rines VILL be levied at tha rate of $50.00 per each violation
of this provision at tins of settle rent per eaoh individual load that oall
was not made.

«§j

-

^ASPORTATION, INC.
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13. ADVAHCIH3 OH LOADS (FASTRACK3)t Lessee ia set up on an adYanoing
•ystai oalled Fastraok. Thii allows ua to giya Laaaor a series of nuabers
(15 digits) worth up to 11,000.00. There is a charge that will be absorbed
by the Laaaor of $3*?0 per transaction, All advances HU3T be taken during
ncraal business hours (8too AH to $t,oo PH, Hon-Fri). There are jJQ, advancing
faraa takan out of tha offioa after hours* Wa bewe had a problaa in tha
Past with losing forae that have been taken out ao there will be abaolutly
*w adranoing on weekends or lata at night*
14. DISPATCH (LOAD) MfflnS OH PAPSnVffiXt All bills of lading, straight
bdlla, photo-oopya, aigned delivery receipts, or freight billa turned in
far billing purpoaaa or payaant to tha B B4 B Transportation offioa HUST
have either a dispatoh or Fro nuaber that i s given to Lessor at tins of
loading, proaantently Barked and circled on each bill of lading pertaining
to that particular load. If paperwork i s turned in without a Dispatoh
Vuaban inert v i l l be a deduotion of $30.00 par each* b i l l of lading that
ia not ao Barked,
15. PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO EQUIPHBHT.. Lessee shall have no responsibility
vhaia oarer for losa or dr-sage to the Leased Equipoent during the tar a of this
fcgraeaont ani Laaaor hereby, for i t s e l f „ i t s suooessors and assigns and i t s
insurers, as tha oaae say be, waiYaa any claisfl i t nay hate against tha
Lea eat fcr such daaage or deatruotion.
16* TAXED AH) UNTrcRH CAB (SARDS. Lessee shall furnish to Laaaor, at
so-rt, .»D" Urdfora Gab cards (HATIUC) and will handle paysent ( to be daducted frosi sattleaant) of fuel taxes far cost of expenses thereof J the
bsjsdling. of all other taxes including but not United to, highway use
tajcaa and groae ton aileaga taxes, shell b« tha sole responsibility of tha
17. CIURQg-BACK ITBK3. It is understood and aoknowladged that upon the
t«raination or cancellation of this agreement tha Laaaor shall return to
Leasee any "D" Unifora Cab Cards (HARUO) fur ni a hod far operations hereunder
ajsd alao shall return any and a l l signs, placards, or Barkings, license
sl^tea, all licensing cards, fuel permits, ha.sardoue p»r*ite, and anything
•£»• furniahad by B B 4 B Tranaportation at the tiao of Lease. If said iteaa
«-a not returned within tan (10) days following the data of aueh termination
- - J-J..-* -ivnVi «nafea froa any rental payaants

Jttl

P.O. BOX 7061
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jponTATioM, INC.
dining due ard payable to the Lessor* Lea we Bay also oharge b*ok to
a Lea tor a l l oosts paid for fuel taxes ttxl said charge back shall be
de by deduction from rental payments due to the Lessor*
18* RESPONSIBIL^Tr, FCR COSTS, Unless expressly prorided to the conary elsewhere herein, the LeBBor shall be responsible for and shall pay
m cost of a l l fuels, lubricating oils, repairs, fuel taxes• enpty mLlasge
raits of a l l kinds and types (except operating authorities granted by the
!C or State Regulatory Agendas) t o l l s , ferries, base plates and other Ttble licenses •
19* PlflCHASEa gflOH IES3EB The Lessor i s not required to purohase cr
nt any products, equipment or servioes froa lessee as a condition for
ntering 'into the Agreement*
20, TERM klV HQTICB. This Agreement shall oantinus for a periM of
drty 'one- (31) days froa the date specified in Section 1 above and there'fcer until cancelled upon thirty (30) days written notice by either party*"—
t the event notice i s to be given pursuant to any provision bf this Agree-*
mt i f to Lessee, i t shall be sent) by certified sail, postage pre-paidf
» telegram toi

B B ft B TUAHSPCRTATIOH,IHC,
PO Box 7061
Murray| Ut* S4107
sl> i f Lessor, i t shall be senb tor

—Af*>t/L tegjf—
We,/>A>' U^L

*Ut4X

ritben notice shall be considered sufficient i f nailed postage prepaid*
irtified or registered mail to the above respective address* Either party
>y change .such notice address at any tine by notice in writing to the other*
21. SUBSTITUriOH Of EQUIPHEHf. In the event any vehicle leased to Leasee
orsuant to this Agreement shall, for any reason, fail to coaplate operation
9 d e s t i n a t i o n , Laeeee s h a l l have the right t o forward the Load or any part
hereof as my be necessary by any weans or vebiale with the leapt posaibla
• l a y , and e h a l l deduct froa any aaount due Lessor the cost and expense there
r.

P.O. BOX 7061
4154 SOUTH 300 WEST
MURRAY, UTAH 8410?
1801)203-2552

TOANSPOnTATlQN, INC,
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22. IDENTIFICATION OF VEHICLES, Leasee shall provide all
identification required by governmental agencies to be affixed
~o the Leased Equipment, and Lessor will be required to have
company name on truck and necessary decals. Lessor shall
promptly remove and return such identification on the termination or cancellation of thi-s Agreement.
23. BREACH OF CONTRACT/TERMINATION, In the event either party
commits a naterial breach of any term of this Agreement, the other
party shall have the right to terminate this Agreement immediately
and hold the breaching party liable for damages occasioned by
such breach, including Attorney fees and Court coats,
24. COPIES IN VEHICLE, Lessor covenants, represents and
guarantees that a signed copy of this Agreement, or statement as
tuth6ri2ed by 49 C.F.R.S. 1057. 11(c) (2), shall be carried in
each unit of the Leased Equipment at all times this Agreement is
in effect.
In witness whereof, the parties have executed this Agreement
of the day and year first above written*

B B & B TRANSPORTATION, INC

m
i^OR&WPA
'LESSOR;
CMP AN It NAME*

^ ^ g - A

fe^f

P.O. BOX 7061
4154 80UTH 300 WEST
MURRAY, UTAH 84107
(801)243-2552
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LEASE EQUIPMENT AGREEMENT
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COMPENSATION SCHEDULE
Lessee will deduct as fair^and equitable compensation fron
each and every ahipment and/or load tranaported by virtue of
Lessee's Common Carrier Authority HC 174343 end sub-paragraphs
thereof 15X or $50.00 which ever ia greater of the gross receipts
All monies are due and payable according to the terms and conditions of the Lease Agreement. Settlements are guaranteed due to
Lessor not later than thirty (30)days after bills are received in
the office and able to forward. Payroll and settlements are
done ONCE a week, on Fridays. If Lessee is paid before the
thirty* (30) days are expired, and there is no claim of damage or
shortage or a claim of any kind, on the load, Lessor will be
Lessor will be settled on the Friday closest.

LESSEE

j0(A/,d

>A./!/j49i>

LESSORX %7**A

*Wl B TRANSPORTATION.
INC
B'fc^&
TRANSPORTATION,INC

DATE

V - ^ dittfttif

/£.

;9</d

Z2<+*td(J
'

DATE\r

JL-/t-*4>

^
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APPENDIX 5
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR AGREEMENT
(EX. D-3, R. 354-356, 374-375)

INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR AGREEMENT

Contract made
/ ~ 22 ~
of A7*f? M *Cto£.
City of
State of Utah, herein referred to
of
$xf+ 6°/** £ <
County of
Tfu^A
to as Contractor.

, 1990 » between Mark Bundy
f/tft;
grU
, County
(Tu^S
as Owner and nt>4ej-T
fA7//,/?£<^
• City of
A/cft/
6/TAA
# State of Utah, herein referred

RECITALS

1. Owner owns certain truck(s) and trucking equipment and
operates a truck ownership business at the address set forth
above, and Owner desires to contract with Contractor to have
Contractor perform the following services: trucking and
truck driving.
2. Contractor desires to perform these services for
Owner under the terms and conditions set forth in this Agreement.
3. Owner desires to terminate all existing agreements and
understandings with Contractor and in lieu thereof, enter into
this Agreement, providing, among other things, for his services.
In consideration of the mutual promises set forth herin, it
is agreed by and between Owner and Contractor:
REPEAL OF EXISTING

SECTION ONE
ARRANGEMENTS/DESCRIPTION OF WORK

Any and all agreements heretofore entered into between
Owner and Contractor are terminated, and each of the parties hereby
releases and discharges the other from any and all obligations and
liabilities heretofore or now existing by reason for any such
agreements, it being the intention of the Owner and Contractor
that this- Agreement shall supersede and be in lieu of any and all
prior agreements or understandings between them.
The work to be performed by Contractor includes all services
generally performed by Contractor in a trucker's usual line of
business, including, but not limited to, the following: receiving
dispatches from
u fl *h/l TA^nS^^T^1/9Aox
other trucking .firm
with which Owner may enter into business relationships), picking
up loads, transporting loads to destinations and return. All
work performed by Contractor in connection with such services
shall be performed solely under the terms and provisions of this
Agreement.
-c *
SECTION TWO
PAYMENT
/tc^l Owner will pay Contractor the total sum of $ Jt& 5%
wild (figured from start of trip to end of trip) for the work
INDUSTRIAL COMM!*"""
^H

per

to be performed under this contract. In order to receive payment,
Contractor must submit an envelope with receipts, bills of
lading, etc., and any other reques*ted/required information to
Owner upon completion ot tne trip. Wicnin five (5) working days of
receipt of such envelope, Owner will make payment to Contractor.
SECTION THREE
RELATIONSHIP OF PARTIES
The parties intend this contract to create an employerindependent contractor relationship. Owner is interested only in
the results to be achieved, and the methods, means, manner, and
conduct of the work will be under the sole control of the
Contractor* Contractor may excercise his independent judgement
as to the hours of employment, place where services will be
rendered, methods of performing such services, etc.
Contractor is not to be considered an agent or employee of
Owner for any prupose, and the Contractor and any of Contractor's
employees are not entitled to any of the benefits that Owner may
provide for Owner's employees, if any. With the relationship
between the parties being owner-independent contractor, Owner
will have no responsibility or obligation for wage withholding
for income tax (federal or state), social security, unemployment
insurance, worker's compensation, health, life or disability
insurance, or to respond to garnishments for alimony, child
support, indebtedness, or similar items. In additon, Owner has
no obligation to include Contractor in any health insurance, life
insurance, disability insurance, pension, profit sharing, stock
purchase or shimilar plans.
Contractor covenants to save Owner harmless from any and all
liability for withholding federal or state income tax, workers
compensation contribution, unemployment insurance and any
Contractor's tax liability now or subsequently imposed on Owner.
Contractor waives all claims against Owner which Contractor may
now have or may subsequently acquire for Owner's liability for
worker's compensation, unemployment insurance or otherwise under
the laws.* of the United States or the State of Utah.
It is understood that Owner does not agree to use Contractor
exclusively. Nothing herein shall be deemed to restrict Owner's
right to employ other persons either as employees or independent
contractors.
SECTION FOUR
DUTIES OF RESPECTIVE PARTIES
Owner will supply* the truck(s) and trucking equipment, be
responsible for licensing the truck(s), carrying insurance on the
2

truck(s) and for all regular or extended maintenance of the
truck(s)•
Contractor assumes all responsibility for performance of this
Agreement. In the performance of the work provided for herein,
Contractor agrees to conduct such work in full compliance with
any and all applicable laws, rules and regulations promulgated or
adopted by any governmental agency or regulatory body, both state
and federal. Contractor covenants to perform such work in a good
and workmanlike manner. Contractor will maintain,\for the
duration of this contaract, all necessary Department of Transportatior
and State of Utah health and driver's licensing qualifications.
The work to be performed under this Agreement will be performed
entirely at Contractor's risk. Contractor agrees to indemnify
Owner for any and all liability or loss arising in any way out
of the performance of this contract.
SECTION FIVE
DURATION/TERMINATION
Either party may cancel this Agreement at any time for any
reason, cause or no cause.
SECTION SIX
MISCELLANEOUS
This Agreement contains the entire agreement between the
parties with respect to the subject matter hereunder.
No waiver, alteration, or modification of the provisions of
this Agreement shall be binding unless in writing and signed
by Mark Bundy and Contractor.
Any assignment of this Agreement by Contractor without the
prior written consent of Owner shall be void.
This Agreement shall be governed by the laws of the State of Utal
Tn witness whereof, the parties have executed this agreement at
/-^/?-» *ft
the day and year first above written.
Mafck Bunuy
Owner

Contractor
3

«•*
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APPENDIX 6
CHARLES KINNE
V.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, 609 P.2d 926 (Utah 1980)
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1 Workera' Compensation *»210

Charles KINNE, Plaintiff,
v.

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, Defendant
No. 16447.
Supreme Court of Utah.
March 5, 1980.
Owner of tractor sought review of an
order of the Industrial Commission which
found joint and several liability on the part
of the owner and the corporate lessee of the
tractor, as employers of a driver who was
killed in a tractor accident The Supreme
Court, Stewart, J., held that: (1) the Commission's conclusion that the driver was in
the course of his employment at the time of
the accident was supported by substantial
evidence; (2) the owner of the tractor was
the driver's employer, for workmen's compensation purposes; and (3) both the owner
and the lessee were liable.
Affirmed.
1. Workers' Compensation *»1719
Whether an accidental injury arises out
of or within the scope of employment depends on the particular circumstances of
each case.
2. Workers' Compensation «»635
Where truck driver's practice was to
take tractor to his home where he cleaned
and serviced it and where it was understood
that this maintenance work was the driver's
responsibility and the work was done with
the knowledge of both the owner and the
lessee of the tractor and where, on weekend
preceding fatal accident the driver had taken the tractor home and had performed
certain required repairs on it for the benefit
of the owner and the lessee and in accord
with the agreement between the two, the
driver was in the course of his employment
when, while en route from his home to the
lessee's place of business to pick up a trailer
and commence the final portion of a trip,
the tractor was struck by a train and the
driver was killed.

Where agreement for lease of tractor
gave the tractor owner the legal right of
direction and control over the driver and
where, under the terms of the agreement,
the owner also had the right to hire and fin
drivers and was responsible for paying the
drivers' wages, the owner was the employer
of a tractor driver, for workmen's compensation purposes, even though the tractor
was under lease to corporate leasee when
the driver was killed while driving the tractor.
4. Workers' Compensation *»3M
Fact that agreement for lease of traetor provided that the tractor's owner would
maintain workmen's compensation coverage
for drivers did not permit the lesaee of the
tractor, the statutory employer of a driver
who was killed while driving the tractor, to
avoid its liability for workmen's compensation benefits.
5. Contracts *»1
It is not unreasonable to hold a party
responsible for obligations he assumes by
contract
«. Contracts ^187(1)
Where agreement for lease of tractor
provided that owner would maintain workmen's compensation coverage for drivers
and since the driven stood in the position of
third-party beneficiaries of the contract between the owner and the leasee, the owner
could not avoid liability for workmen's compensation benefits as spelled out by the
terms of the signed agreement even though
the leesee, as statutory employer, was also
responsible for workmen's compensation
coverage.

Brian R. Florence, Ogden, for plaintiff.
Robert B. Hansen, Atty. Gen., Frank V.
Nelson, Asst Atty. Gen., M. David Eckeraley of Black & Moore, Andrew R. Hurlay of
Lowe & Huriey, Salt Lake City, for defandant

KINNE v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
Utah 927
ctoM,uufciier.Mtss
STEWART, Justice:
lease agreement and that Kinne was therePlaintiff, Charles Kinne, sought review of fore jointly and severally liable with Freean order of the State Industrial Commission port for the compensation award. Kinne's
which found joint and several liability on appeal is from that order.
the part of Kinne and Freeport Transport,
An order of the Industrial Commission
Inc., u employers of Max L Wynn, who will stand unless it is contrary to law or
was killed in a tractor accident Kinne unsupported by substantial evidence, f 86contends the facts do not support the Com- 1-64 U.OA. (1*8), as amended. Kinne armission's findings (1) that Wynn's accident gues that the Commission erred in its find*
occurred in the course of his employment ings that Wynn was in the coarse of his
and (2) that Kinne was Wynn's employer. employment at the time of the fatal acciIn May 1976 Kinne entered into an agree- dent and that Kinne was Wynn's employer
ment with Freeport Transport, Inc., provide for purposes of workmen's compensation
ing for the lease of a tractor owned by coverage.
Kinne to Freeport Pursuant to the writ[1] Whether an accidental injury arises
ten agreement, Kinne was to be responsible, out of or within the scope of employment
inter slit, for the direction, control, salaries, depends upon the particular circumstances
and workmen's compensation coverage of
of each case, Momr v. Industrie/ Commishis employees. Freeport assumed liability
sion, 21 Utah 2d 51, 440 P.2d 2B (1968).
for injuries resulting from the negligent
This case, like Moser, is distinguishable
operation of the vehicle involving others
from the usual case of going to, or coming
than Kinne or his employees. Kinne failed
from, work, which is not generally within
to provide workmen's compensation coverthe scope of employment, Wilton v. Indusage.
trial Commission, 116 Utah 46, 207 ?2d
In November 1976, Max L. Wynn, who 1116 (1949).
had been hired by Kinne as a driver, took
[2] The Commission in the instant case
the tractor home during an interruption in
found
Wynn's practice was to take the traca trip from Colorado to California. When
tor
to
his home, where he cleaned and serhe was en route from his home to Freeviced
it
to keep it in proper running condiport's place of business in Clearfield, Utah,
tion.
It
was understood that this mainteto pick up a trailer and commence the final
nance
work
was Wynn's responsibility, and
portion of the trip, the tractor was struck
it
was
done
with the knowledge of both
by a train and Wynn was killed.
Kinne and the general manager of FreeWynn's widow filed for workmen's com- port Wynn kept the required maintenance
pensation benefits. In July 1978 the Indus- tools at his home. On the weekend precedtrial Commission's administrative law judge ing the accident, Wynn had taken the tracdetermined that Wynn was not in the scope tor home and had performed certain reand course of his employment at the time of quired repairs on it, for the benefit of
the accident, and compensation benefits Kinne and Freeport and in accord with the
were therefore denied. The judge also agreement between the two employers.
found that Wynn was an employee of Free- The Commission's conclusion that Wynn
port and not of Kinne. In February 1979 was in the course of his employment at the
the Commission granted Mrs. Wynn's mo- time of the accident is clearly supported by
tion for review and held that Wynn was in substantial evidence.
the course of his employment when he was
[3] Kinne's argument that he was not
killed and that Mrs. Wynn was entitled to
benefits. In response to an inquiry as to Wynn's employer and therefore had no liajoint liability by the State Insurance Fund, bility for workmen's compensation is withFreeport's insurer, the Commission by sup- out merit The question of who is an emplemental order held that Wynn was an ployer under a truck lease has been a recuremployee of Kinne under the terms of the ring one before this Court The Commie-
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sion in this case found that the express
terms of Kinne's lease agreement with
FVeeport made Kinne the employer of
Wynn. The agreement gave Kinne the legal right of direction and control over
Wynn, even though such right may not
have been exercised. It is the right of
control that is the critical element underlying an employment relationship in the
present case. See Utah Fire Clay Co. v.
Industrial Commission, 86 Utah 1, 40 P.2d
183 (1935); Auerbach Co. v. Industrial Commission, 113 Utah 347, 195 P.2d 245 (1948).
Under the terms of the lease agreement,
Kinne also had the right to hire and fire
Wynn, he was responsible for paying
Wynn's wages, and he owned and leased the
tractor and trailer used by Wynn in the
performance of his duties. See Harry L
Young A Sons, Inc. v. Ashton, Utah, 538
P.2d 316 (1975). These factors support the
Commission's finding that Kinne was
Wynn's employer.

of his obligation by the fact that another
employer, Freeport Transport, Inc-, was a
statutory employer also responsible for
workmen's compensation coverage. An employee, for the purpose of workmen's compensation, may have two employers. See
Blessing v. T. Shriver A Co., 94 N J.Super.
426, 228 A.2d 711 (1967).

[4,5] The lease agreement provided
that Kinne would maintain workmen's compensation coverage for his drivers. Such an
agreement dearly may not be used to avoid
liability for workmen's compensation benefits by a statutory employer, such as Freeport was found to be in the present case.
But Kinne seeks to disclaim his liability for
compensation benefits in spite of the express terms of the agreement making him
responsible for such coverage. It is not
unreasonable to hold a party responsible for
obligations he assumes by contract Furthermore, Wynn stood in the position of a
third-party beneficiary of the contract between Kinne and Freeport, since the workmen's compensation provision was for the
benefit of the drivers hired by Kinne for
the vehicles he leased to Freeport. Kinne
may not avoid his liability to Wynn as
spelled out by the terms of his signed agreement.

v.
Milan Mack BOYCE, Defendant
and Respondent

[6] The findings of the Commission are
supported by the record. It did not err as a
matter of law in finding an employment
relationship between Kinne and Wynn and
joint liability for compensation on the part
of Kinne Moreover, Kinne is not relieved

The Commission's order is affirmed.
CROCKETT, C. J., and MAUGHAN,
WILKINS and HALL, JJ., concur.

(o

|KtY*UftlKtSYSTES>

Nina Doreen Davis BOYCE, Plaintiff
and Appellant

No. 16342.
Supreme Court of Utah.
March 5, 1980.
Wife moved to set aside a divorce decree on ground of fraud. The Third District Court Salt Lake County, Homer F.
Wilkinson, J., denied the motion, and wife
appealed. The Supreme Court, Stewart J.»
held that trial court abused its discretion in
refusing to allow wife a hearing on her
motion to set aside a divorce decree on
grounds of fraud, since it appeared that the
assets of parties might actually have been
more than five times the amount disclosed
by husband at time of settlement agreement, there was support in record for wife's
contention that husband prevented wife
from gaining full and accurate knowledge
of his total assets, and husband's record of
noncompliance with discovery procedure
would not be overlooked solely on ground
that wife was perhaps guilty of some de-

